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Maximizing Participation Through Campaign Finance Regulation: A Cap 
and Trade Mechanism for Political Money  
 
Abstract. This Article attempts to reroute a burgeoning area of campaign 
finance scholarship and reform. Though many previous proposals have 
enshrined liberty or equality as the sole animating value to pursue through 
doctrinal and political means, few have considered the impact of campaign 
finance regulation on citizen participation. Those that have proposed 
participation as a goal often remain tied to unworkable or self-defeating 
notions of equality. In building an alternative model of maximizing 
participation, this Article rejects the premise that direct political action such as 
volunteering embodies a superior form of participation to contributions, but 
recognizes the externalities that the latter form may produce. It proposes a new 
mechanism for reform: a cap and trade policy in which citizens can increase 
their rights to contribute to political candidates or parties based by purchasing 
permits from other contributors. Derived from proposals to regulate pollution 
in environmental economics, this mechanism serves as a helpful alternative to 
ineffective and inefficient contribution limits. 
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 The 2008 election cycle challenged the received wisdom of the 
campaign finance reform movement that political money is the “root of all 
evil” in democratic politics.1 Record amounts of money flowed into the 
campaign war chests of each major candidate, but the sheer volume of political 
money did not deter even small donations.2 Citizens with little previous 
connection to democratic politics beyond their Election Day vote offered small 
money donations in record amounts, playing their part in the seminal historic 
moment.3 Political money, rather than hindering or discouraging participation 
in the democratic process, instead allowed citizens to express their support and 
association even in small amounts. The election suggests that both the existing 
framework of campaign finance regulation, as well as reform proposals that 
simply seek to limit contributions, warrant a fresh and pragmatic reappraisal. 
 Indeed, campaign finance regulation plays both an iconic and ironic 
role in modern constitutional law. Most agree that the dominant doctrine, 
embodied in Buckley v. Valeo,4 ought to be discarded, though the constitutional 
basis for this change provokes considerable dispute. The doctrine provides the 
contours of modern regulation of political money, and reformers have pursued 
two avenues of change. One branch of scholarship has assailed the doctrine as 
woefully inadequate, ignoring political equality and curbing the influence of 
disparities of wealth as valid concerns to be advanced under the First 
Amendment. This method generally seeks to provide ammunition for some 
future Supreme Court majority willing to discard Buckley. Another branch of 
scholarship has rushed ahead, crafting reform proposals that might deliver on 
the promise of the Federal Election Campaign Act and the more recent 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. These proposals, whether relying on a post-
Buckley vision of permissible government regulation or not, have sought to 
advance substantive ideals such as reduced corruption, social equality, or 
increased participation. 
                                                 
1 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply 
Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301 (1989). 
2 See Bradley A. Smith, Op-Ed., Obama’s Huge Haul Should End This Fight, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 26, 2008, at B01. 
3 Id. (“Obama has indeed attracted record numbers of small contributors, many giving just a 
few dollars over the Internet.”). 
4 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 3
Anti-reformers have played an important role in this dialogue as well, 
raising questions over whether existing or proposed reforms are effective in 
advancing their professed goals. The intrinsically fluid nature of political 
money resists attempts to advance equality in the political process, leaving 
most reform visions hopelessly wanting. One popular critique of campaign 
finance reform proposals is that money displays a “hydraulic” propensity to 
flow around any regulations put in place.5 Given limits on the donor-recipient 
relationship, money will only flow to third parties, often less accountable and 
transparent. 
This Article accepts these critiques, and offers a new perspective to the 
dialogue on the scope and goals of campaign finance reform. It argues that 
reform efforts should seek to maximize political participation. This goal entails 
two prongs—broadening the base of citizens who participate in the political 
process, and enhancing their ability to effectively participation and express 
their support. Central to this goal is the notion that contributions form a 
legitimate method of political participation, on par with direct activities such as 
volunteering. 
Based on the recognition that contributions can play a positive social 
role, this Article offers an alternative conception of campaign money—
pollution. Like polluters, campaign contributors produce negative externalities 
that harm the system of democratic politics and heighten the effects of 
inequality. Negative externalities are defined as detrimental harms incurred by 
individuals who are not the source of the harm.6 If, as the Buckley Court 
presumed, corruption is a likely result of unrestrained contributions, 
contribution caps can control this externality and serve a justifiable purpose.7 
Though expenditure limits were deemed too great a burden on First 
Amendment rights to uphold, contributions arguably create a second-order 
externality by increasing the effects of social and economic inequality. The 
goal of regulation, then, is to force the externality-creating party to internalize 
the cost of the harm caused to his or her neighbors, or to society.8 
 I apply this Article’s participatory model to evaluate both existing and 
proposed reforms to consider the optimal method of maximizing participation 
while mitigating the externalities of political money. Contribution limits pose a 
substantial hindrance to effective participation under this framework, because 
they force individuals to choose between two suboptimal methods of 
participating once they reach donation limits. More recent reform proposals, 
though varying in their method, advance the notion of subsidized political 
donations made broadly available to voters. From the participation-maximizing 
perspective, this method is superior to the status quo, but ultimately it 
                                                 
5 Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1999). 
6 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 3.10, at 71 (6th ed. 2003) 
(defining externalities as “costs” that a decisionmaker “will not take into account in making his 
decisions”). 
7 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. 
8 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic 
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 752 (1996). 
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represents a cynical and potentially counterproductive means of enhancing 
participation. 
 Building on this analysis, this Article presents a new model of 
campaign regulation: cap and trade for campaign contributions. By allowing a 
market for contributions above existing limits, cap and trade could capture 
individual preferences while still increasing the price of contributions beyond 
these limits. Unlike a progressive tax, the decentralized market mechanism 
would dictate the price, which in turn would curb the externalities stemming 
from political donations. The ability to buy and sell permits for political 
donations offers an incentive to new contributors (rather than a subsidy) tied 
directly to the market for political money. This device offers the ability to 
broaden and enhance participation, while still controlling for the negative 
consequences associated with high levels of political money in democratic 
politics. Under the externalities framework, the cap and trade mechanism 
balances the diametrically opposed conceptions of political money’s effects. 
 Part I of this Article provides an overview of campaign finance doctrine 
and major scholarship. Part II introduces a model of participation and 
distinguishes it from existing proposals seeking to broaden participation 
through campaign finance reform. Part III analyzes and critiques several 
reforms based on this model, and Part IV introduces and defends the cap and 
trade model for regulating campaign finance. 
 
I. CAMPAIGN FINANCE DOCTRINE AND THE CONCEPTUAL DIVIDE 
 
The lack of guidance the Constitution and the Founding Era provide the 
field of election law is accentuated in campaign finance doctrine. Absent a 
guiding principle rooted in the text or structure of the Constitution, the divide 
between proponents and opponents of campaign regulation could not be wider. 
Norms deriving from political philosophy or constitutional values do not stem 
from a single, first-order consensus on the meaning and normative implications 
of our democratic structure. 
This principled divide carries on today largely as a result of the 1976 
Supreme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo,9 which set out a framework for 
evaluating the constitutionality of restrictions on campaign contributions and 
expenditures. Buckley has spawned substantial criticism, and the several active 
Justices on the Court have expressed willingness to overturn the landmark 
decision.10 
This Part provides an overview of the Buckley decision and its 
evolution into present day Roberts Court jurisprudence, highlighting the 
analytical tension between two competing visions of the constitutionality of 
                                                 
9 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
10 See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2778 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I have since been 
persuaded that Justice White—who maintained his steadfast opposition to Buckley’s view of 
expenditure limits—was correct.” (citation omitted)); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 273 
(2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Buckley provides no consistent protection to the core of the 
First Amendment, and must be overruled.”). 
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regulations on the democratic process. Sections I.B and I.C scrutinize the 
animating rationales behind proponents and opponents of campaign finance 
regulation. From this analysis, it becomes clear that no singular value provides 
a satisfactory framework for evaluating modern campaign regulations, and 
oftentimes the remedy appears to exacerbate the disease. 
 
 A. Buckley and Its Progeny: Regulating Campaign Finance To Reduce 
Corruption 
 
 How did Buckley become so reviled, such that critics compare the 
decision to a modern-day Lochner v. New York?11 The decision marked a 
dramatic rebuke to the burgeoning campaign finance movement, compelled in 
part by the rising influence of money in politics and the perceived need to curb 
political corruption in the wake of President Nixon’s resignation.12 As this 
Section describes, the Court in Buckley drew a distinction between restrictions 
on campaign contributions and expenditures, evaluating each through the First 
Amendment lens of barriers to free speech and association—a framework that 
still holds traction in today’s Supreme Court. 
 The 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
(FECA)13 established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and granted the 
agency powers to enforce sweeping new regulations limiting political 
expenditures and contributions, and providing optional public election 
financing.14 The comprehensive legislation suffered no shortage of ambition. It 
set strict limits on contributions and expenditures in an attempt to cap the 
overall amount of campaign money. FECA conditioned the receipt of public 
funding on the acceptance of hard spending caps in the general election, set at 
$20 million for the 1974 election cycle.15 This set of restrictions on spending 
set the table for a constitutional challenge occurring before the full set of 
amendments could be implemented. 
 The challenge brought against the legislation in Buckley was brought 
by ideologically and politically diverse plaintiffs, represented by attorneys 
                                                 
11 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended 
Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1397-1400 (1994); see also Bradley A. Smith, The 
John Roberts Salvage Company: After McConnell, A New Court Looks To Repair the 
Constitution, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 912 (2007) (“[I]n a law faculty lounge, [Buckley] ranks 
somewhere between the Great Depression and the McCarthy hearings as the blackest moment 
in twentieth-century America.”). 
12 See Justin A. Nelson, Note, The Supply and Demand of Campaign Finance Reform, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 524, 536 (2000). 
13 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). 
14 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(1974); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (calling the 1974 
amendments “by far the most comprehensive, reform legislation passed by Congress 
concerning the election of the President Vice-President, and members of Congress”), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For an overview of pre-Buckley campaign finance 
regulations, see Nelson, supra note 12, at 533-36. 
15 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 § 101(c)(1)(B). Unlike contribution 
limits, this spending cap was indexed to increase in each election cycle. 
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working pro bono who “generally shared a libertarian ideological stance.”16 
The chief plaintiffs, Senator James Buckley and former Senator Eugene 
McCarthy, believed that this new campaign finance structure would “violate[] 
the First Amendment” and “would limit the ability of similar candidates in the 
future to challenge status quo politics.”17 The District of Columbia Circuit 
upheld the Act, rejecting the First Amendment argument on the grounds that 
spending restrictions were conduct-related, not speech-related.18 The Supreme 
Court reversed course. 
 The Supreme Court overturned the Act in part, finding expenditure 
limits unconstitutional, but allowing contribution limits and public funding 
provisions.19 The Court found that the $1000 limit on individual contributions 
was directly aligned with “the Act’s primary purpose to limit the actuality and 
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial 
contributions.”20 Without providing further calculus as to how contributions 
above this cap might increase corruption, the Court was satisfied to rest this 
portion of its holding on Congress’s reasoning that “the integrity of our system 
of representative democracy is undermined . . . to the extent that large 
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo.”21 First Amendment 
arguments that such contribution limits burdened individual rights to speech 
and association were unavailing, given the government’s interest in curbing the 
appearance or reality of corruption. 
 The Court was less generous to expenditure limits, finding that “the 
First Amendment requires the invalidation of the Act’s independent 
expenditure ceiling, its limitation on a candidate’s expenditures from his own 
personal funds, and its ceilings on overall campaign expenditures.”22 The 
expenditure limits, too far removed from the anticorruption rationale, placed 
restrictions on “protected political expression . . . that the First Amendment 
cannot tolerate.”23 Importantly, the Court rejected arguments that contribution 
and expenditure limits could be justified on the basis that they equalize relative 
speaking power or balance the content of political speech—values which are 
“wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”24 
 In sum, the Court found that Congress’s broad FECA campaign finance 
restrictions were “half right”—in other words, that “government may restrict 
the supply of political money flowing to a candidate but not the demand.”25 
Buckley, of course, marked the beginning of the political and constitutional 
                                                 
16 Ralph K. Winter, The History and Theory of Buckley v. Valeo, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 93, 93 
(1997). 
17 Id. 
18 Buckley, 519 F.2d at 840. 
19 424 U.S. at 143. 
20 Id. at 26. The Court similarly upheld $5000 caps on contributions from political committees 
to candidates. Id. at 35-36. 
21 Id. at 26-27. 
22 Id. at 58 (citations omitted). 
23 Id. at 59. 
24 Id. at 49. 
25 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 311. 
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struggle over restricting campaign money, not the end. Despite continued 
efforts to restrict direct or coordinated expenditures over the past three 
decades, the Court has not found the occasion to overturn Buckley. Subsequent 
decisions have refined its justification on limiting contributions but not 
expenditures, though the anticorruption rationale has remained central to the 
Court’s inquiry.26 Reformers have made inroads with the Court upholding 
restrictions on corporate expenditures in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce,27 but the Court has been unwilling to uphold restrictions on 
organizations whose primary function is to engage in political speech.28 
 Several cases preceding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) 
added further gloss to the Court’s Buckley analysis. In Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri Government PAC, the Court held that the anticorruption rationale 
could serve to justify state regulations on campaign contributions bearing a 
“striking resemblance to limitations sustained in Buckley.”29 Two First 
Amendment challenges arising from Colorado allowed the Court to elaborate 
on FECA’s party campaign committee expenditure limits, finding that 
expenditures coordinated with the candidate were tantamount to contributions 
and subject to valid limits, while uncoordinated,30 independent expenditures 
were not.31 The dissenters in Colorado Republican II noted that “[p]olitical 
parties and their candidates are ‘inextricably intertwined’ in the conduct of an 
election,”32 leaving the inquiry into whether expenditures are “coordinated” or 
“uncoordinated” a vacuous one. The outcome of these cases masks the irony of 
the Court’s continuing application of Buckley to campaign finance cases 
considering increasingly complex regulations. Multiple Justice called for the 
overturning of Buckley outright, but simply disagreed on the means of 
achieving this end and the new standard of scrutiny to apply to First 
Amendment challenges. More recent cases decided by the Roberts Court 
suggest this stalemate persists even further. 
 BCRA, enacted in 2002 and made effective in 2003, was primarily 
designed to combat the increasing role of soft money in campaign financing 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264-65 (1986) (plurality 
opinion) (finding invalid a prohibition on corporate expenditures  when applied to a nonprofit 
organization established to engage in core political speech); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-60 (1990) (justifying a restriction on corporate expenditures as 
narrowly tailored to the anticorruption rationale and the “concern about corporate domination 
of the political process” ). 
27 494 U.S. at 659; see FEC v. Nat’l Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982). 
28 See, e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) 
(finding restrictions on expenditures by a political action committee invalid because “the 
expenditures at issue . . . produce speech at the core of the First Amendment”). 
29 528 U.S. 377, 395 (2000). The Court rejection of a First Amendment challenge to state 
contribution limits highlighted its splintering in the support for Buckley’s continued application 
to campaign finance regulations. See infra Sections I.B-C. 
30 FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican II), 533 U.S. 431 
(2001). 
31 Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado Republican I), 518 U.S. 604 
(1996). 
32 Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 469 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Colorado 
Republican I, 518 U.S. at 630 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
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and the proliferation of issue advertisements. The Act was challenged in 
McConnell v. FEC33 but upheld by a narrow majority. The “soft money” 
loophole was designed to account for FECA’s shortcomings, in effect plugging 
the holes in the regulation that allowed money to exert influence over national 
election campaigns. In particular, BCRA section 323(a) prevented national 
parties from shifting soft money to state-level candidates, and section 323(b) 
eliminated the flow of money from state and local party committees to federal 
election activity.34 The Court found these restrictions to have only marginal 
impact on political speech and association, applying Buckley’s “closely drawn” 
scrutiny that “shows proper deference to Congress’ ability to weigh competing 
constitutional interests.”35 Similarly, the Court upheld BCRA’s application of 
existing disclosure requirements to “electioneering communications”—that is, 
issue ads that avoided direct advocacy for or against a candidate.36 These issue 
ads were identified by one of the Act’s sponsors as the “biggest end run around 
the campaign finance laws” because they closely matched the substance of 
direct advocacy without disclosing the identity of their source.37 
 McConnell, in effect, ratified the new set of campaign finance 
regulations based on an applied Buckley framework. The closely divided Court 
signaled that the stalemate might be a fragile one, though, and recent cases 
suggest a possible turn of course in the application of the Buckley standard. 
 After Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the Court, it faced 
an early challenge to the campaign finance paradigm in Randall v. Sorrell.38 
The Court held unconstitutional both expenditure and contribution limits 
enacted by the Vermont state legislature on First Amendment grounds. 
Vermont’s campaign finance law imposed “mandatory expenditure limits on 
the total amount a candidate can spend,” separating the permissible 
expenditure limits based on the level of office sought.39 The Court, applying 
Buckley, rejected the contention the contention that the interest in “limiting the 
amount of time state officials must spend raising campaign funds” justified the 
expenditure limits and held them unconstitutional.40 More troublesome, 
though, were Vermont’s individual and party contribution limits. Buckley left 
unanswered the question “how low is too low?”, which the Court took the 
opportunity to answer. Vermont’s contribution limits, including the $200 per 
election per candidate limit, were “sufficiently low as to generate suspicion 
that they were not closely drawn,” and the Court held the law unconstitutional 
in its entirety.41 
                                                 
33 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
34 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 82 (2002) 
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441 (2006)). 
35 540 U.S. at 95. 
36 Id. at 195-96. 
37 149 CONG. REC. S5738-01 (daily ed. May 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
38 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
39 Id. at 237. 
40 Id. at 245-46 (“[T]he respondents’ argument amounts to no more than an invitation so to 
limit Buckley’s holding as effectively to overrule it. . . . [W]e decline that invitation as well.”). 
41 Id. at 249. 
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 The holding in Randall that contribution limits might be too low 
offered a new justification for overturning contribution limits; namely, that low 
limits “can harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from 
mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby 
reducing democratic accountability.”42 Justice Breyer’s majority opinion 
embraced a structural critique of campaign finance laws. Instead of directly 
acknowledging or refuting the First Amendment individual rights argument, 
the holding only invites courts to adopt a more rigorous level of scrutiny only 
if political competition is hindered by the contribution limits. 
 Only a year later, the Court in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life carved 
out a major exception to BCRA’s regulation of issue ads prior to elections.43 
Section 203 of BCRA limited broadcast ads within thirty days of a primary 
election or within sixty days of a general election—a provision which was 
upheld by the Court five years earlier in McConnell v. FEC.44 Justice Roberts, 
writing for the majority, held that “the speech at issue in [WRTL’s] as-applied 
challenge is not the functional equivalent of express campaign speech” and that 
“the interests held to justify restricting corporate campaign speech or its 
functional equivalent do not justify restricting issue advocacy.”45 
 The Court trimmed back the protection of BCRA further in Davis v. 
FEC46 by overturning the “Millionaire’s Amendment,” which reduced fund-
raising limits for candidates whose opponents spent over $350,000 of their 
personal funds during the campaign.47 Once the self-financing candidate 
passed this threshold level, his or her opponent would be able to receive three 
times the standard individual contribution limit of $2300, “even from 
individuals who have reached the normal aggregate contributions cap, and may 
accept coordinated party expenditures without limit.”48 Following Buckley’s 
“emphasis on the fundamental nature of the right to spend personal funds for 
campaign speech,” the Court held that BCRA “imposes an unprecedented 
penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises that First Amendment 
right.”49 
 The Court’s decision in Davis v. FEC highlights the conceptual 
murkiness of the expenditure/contribution distinction. If an individual’s self-
funded campaign amounts to aggregate expenditures, then under the standard 
                                                 
42 Id. If lower courts find that “there is a strong indication in a particular case, i.e., danger 
signs, that such risks exist (both present in kind and likely serious in degree,” they should 
“review the record independently and carefully with an eye toward assessing . . . the 
proportionality of the restrictions.” Id. 
43 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
44 540 U.S. 205-06 (2003). 
45 127 S. Ct. at 2659 (internal quotation marks omitted). Echoing Buckley, the Court also 
rejected the argument that the “distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth . . . [with] 
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas” would 
justify regulation of WRTL’s issue ads. Id. at 2656 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)). 
46 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). 
47 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2006). 
48 128 S. Ct. at 2766. 
49 Id. at 2772. 
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Buckley framework, the regulation arguably violates the First Amendment. But 
if one conceptualizes the self-funded campaign as a series of self-contributions, 
the case for a First Amendment violations may reasonably fail. To be certain, 
the singular anticorruption rationale of Buckley fails to account for this 
scenario—“corruption” is not a looming danger over contributions when the 
donor and the recipient are one and the same.50 
 Whatever its faults, the Buckley framework still holds weight and is the 
dominant paradigm for evaluating campaign finance laws. But most notable 
about Buckley and subsequent campaign finance case law is what the Court 
does not deem a valid justification for regulations. In fact, the array of modern 
campaign regulations illustrates how the anticorruption rationale only scratches 
the surface of the government interests that FECA and BRFA seek to advance. 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Randall v. Sorrell overturned contribution 
limits on structuralist grounds divorced entirely from the First Amendment 
analysis usually applied. While professing adherence to Buckley, the Court 
seeks to advance alternative values and norms in this same manner. The 
following sections explore these normative visions that extend beyond the 
anticorruption rationale so often invoked in campaign finance decisions. 
 
B. Regulation To Promote Equality 
 
 One of the dominant criticisms of post-Buckley campaign finance 
doctrine centers on its indifference to equality norms advanced through 
regulating campaign contributions and expenditures. Equality-oriented 
reformers have advanced powerful arguments against Buckley, as well as 
regulatory initiatives to achieve the end of leveling the playing field of 
influence over politics. This Section provides a brief overview of this 
scholarship and criticizes the equality norm as inadequate to the circumstances 
of modern democratic elections. 
 The equality justification for campaign finance regulation closely 
parallels the one person-one vote principle of equal suffrage embodied in 
political reapportionment cases such as Baker v. Carr.51 This view considers 
the disproportionate influence over the political process that wealth affords as 
fundamentally incompatible with democratic norms embodied in this 
principle.52 This orientation recognizes that the political process consists of 
more participation and dialogue between candidates and the electorate than 
Election Day itself. The final vote-casting is but one component of a much 
                                                 
50 See id. at 2773 (“The burden imposed by [BCRA] § 319(a) on the expenditure of personal 
funds is not justified by any governmental interest in eliminating corruption or the perception 
of corruption.”). 
51 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (discussing the one 
person-one vote principle). 
52 See David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1369, 1387-88 (1994) (“[A] necessary target of any egalitarian campaign finance reform 
is large contributions by wealthy individuals . . . . [F]or people to use their large personal 
wealth to promote their private political agenda is the clearest breach of the ‘one person, one 
vote’ ideal.”). 
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larger democratic process that traverses both the primary and general election. 
In the absence of regulation, citizens can translate wealth into systematic 
advantages and influence over this political process.53 During the early stages 
of an election cycle, candidate positions are largely fungible, and political 
donations both shape the final policy goals of the major candidates and provide 
the capital necessary to build a network of support. Failing to regulate political 
financing simply perpetuates existing inequality of resources, as candidates 
will shift their orientation toward the wealthiest donors. This structural defect 
can dilute the voice of the poor and resource-constrained, restraining the the 
one person-one vote ideal’s substantive effect.54 
 In the reformers’ view, campaign finance regulation should further the 
goal of equality in the electoral process, and comprehensive statutory 
frameworks closing any gaps or loopholes in private funding is essential to 
democratic legitimacy. Reformers are not uniform in the view that equal 
influence over the political process is constitutionally mandated, as other pro-
regulation scholars believe that this principle helps justify campaign 
regulations as constitutionally permissible.55 But they share a common 
understanding that equality norms can and should be recognized as compelling 
government interests. 
 Perhaps most jarring to adherents to the equality goal is that the 
substantive ends they seek—preventing elections from going to the highest 
bidder, reducing excessive influence of the wealthy, and ensuring 
responsiveness to all constituents—form the core of Buckley’s anticorruption 
rationale.56 Though not a perfect proxy, it is difficult to find a practice of 
corruption (or the perception of corruption) that is not also a symptom of social 
inequality. Thus, an unequal distribution of resources is considered an 
underlying cause of corruption in the political process. From this 
understanding, the pro-equality reformers’ hostility to Buckley becomes clear: 
                                                 
53 Kathleen Sullivan, though skeptical of campaign finance regulations, provides an excellent 
summary of this view: “[C]ampaign finance amounts to a kind of shadow election, and 
unequal campaign outlays amount to a kind of metaphysical gerrymander by which some votes 
count more than others . . . .” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 672 (1997); see also Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: 
A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1226 (arguing that 
because “[v]oting is only the final stage of the electoral process,” the principle of “equal 
opportunity to participate in electoral politics . . . must be understood to encompass not only an 
equal vote, but also the equal opportunity to attempt to persuade one’s fellow voters”). 
54 See generally Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 49-50 (1987) (explaining that the existing distribution of resources is a first-order 
justification for campaign finance restrictions, and hypothesizing a resource distribution that 
might justify unregulated contributions to political candidates). 
55 Compare Foley, supra note 53, at 1257 (“[T]he nation ought to adopt equal-dollars-per-voter 
as part of its conception of constitutional democracy.”), with Strauss, supra note 52, at 1383 
(arguing that the one person-one vote principle undermines the Buckley Court’s contention that 
“the aspiration (of equalizing political speech) is foreign to the First Amendment”). 
56 See David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 141, 144-49 (explaining that in the absence of inequality, the anticorruption rationale would 
be largely obviated). 
 12
by rejecting the equality rationale, the Court ignored the root disease by 
limiting its holding to the symptoms that result.57 
 The goal of promoting equality through campaign regulation has not 
gained full support on Supreme Court, which has maintained Buckley’s 
reticence to endorse the equality rationale as a compelling government 
interest.58 This rationale still underlies a number of interests advanced and, at 
times, vindicated by the Court. In fact, one might argue that the Court 
effectively bootstraps an equality justification onto competing rationales for 
campaign regulations, such as the curbing the “corrosive and distorting effects 
of immense aggregations of [corporate] wealth.”59 Reconciling this 
justification or the interest in “preserving the integrity of the electoral 
process”60 with the Buckley Court’s rejection of equality norms is a formidable 
task. The question, then, is how far the anticorruption rationale may be 
leveraged to advance substantive equality norms.  
A minority of the current Court is willing to either overturn Buckley or 
restrict its scope substantially to allow greater regulation of political 
expenditures. Justice Stevens has emerged as a champion of this position, 
channeling Justice White’s opposition to Buckley and arguing that “it is quite 
wrong to equate money and speech.”61 Likening expenditure limits to “time, 
place, and manner restrictions,” Justice Stevens would uphold such restrictions 
“so long as the purposes they serve are legitimate and sufficiently 
substantial,”62 and he has suggested that “the Government has an important 
interest in leveling the electoral playing field.”63 Recent campaign finance 
decisions by the Roberts Court, however, suggest continuing unwillingness to 
let an equality rationale or one of its variants swallow the First Amendment 
interests in political speech and association.64 If this core component of 
Buckley still exerts strength, reformers must adapt their strategy. 
                                                 
57 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 884 (1987) (explaining 
that, like Lochner, the Court in Buckley viewed “the existing distribution of wealth . . . as 
natural” and that “for constitutional purposes, the existing distribution of wealth must be taken 
as simply ‘there,’ and that efforts to change that distribution are impermissible”). 
58 See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political 
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985) (“[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for 
restricting campaign finances.”). 
59 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); see also McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 330 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]his rationale has no 
limiting principle”). 
60 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 119. 
61 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 276 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see J. Skelly Wright, 
Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). 
62 Id. at 277 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 264 (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
63 Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 649 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Justice Stevens, in Colorado Republican I, did not endorse the equality rationale 
rejected in Buckley outright, but instead centered his argument on “the interest in informed 
debate protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 650. 
64 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773; Randall, 548 U.S. at 230. 
 13
 Criticism of this rationale for campaign finance regulation suggests that 
equality alone cannot support a coherent or pragmatic campaign finance 
doctrine. The campaign finance debate has evolved from a battle of First 
Amendment speech versus political equality to a recognition that equality-
oriented reform might undermine itself. 
 First, the theoretical basis for political equality can only stretch so far 
before its burden on other constitutional provisions proves untenable. Taken to 
its logical end, Judge Ralph Winter argues, “if equality is truly a goal justifying 
the suppression of speech, then virtually no political communication of 
consequence can have First Amendment protection.”65 Truly equal political 
communication has not been tested, but its simple consequences may be 
predictable: genuine equality would compel censorship that would cripple the 
market for political speech, and established media outlets will be empowered 
substantially because they control access to non-advertisement political 
speech.66 Even at the theoretical level, equality of political speech is difficult to 
reconcile with “conventional First Amendment norms of individualism, 
relativism, and antipaternalism.”67 Even a more collectivist conception of 
political speech rights might be problematic under the absolutist conception of 
equality.68 This First Amendment objection to the purest form of equality 
attacks a red herring, one might argue. Recognizing a compelling government 
interest in regulating political expenditures is a far cry from mandating 
equality. The dominant mode of anti-Buckley equality arguments might be 
better characterized as “inequality-reducing” rather than “equality-
maximizing.” In other words, expanding the sphere of acceptable government 
interests beyond the anticorruption rationale would allow Congress to reduce 
the externalities of political inequality.69 
 Critics of campaign finance reform argue further, however, that the 
very regulatory framework produces its own externalities, and the remedy 
might prove worse than the underlying disease. These criticisms operate from 
the general premise that political money is exceedingly difficult to regulate, 
and caps on contributions or expenditures will simply channel money to less 
accountable actors.70 This criticism, advanced by Samuel Issacharoff and 
Pamela Karlan, was echoed in the Court’s decision in McConnell: “Money, 
                                                 
65 Winter, supra note 16, at 97. 
66 Id. at 97-98. One might argue that unregulated Internet speech outlets might similarly be 
empowered. For an argument that Congress should regulated advertising expenditures 
appearing online, see Ari Weisbard, Buying an Audience: Justifying the Regulation of 
Campaign Expenditures that Buy Access to Voters, 118 YALE L.J. 379, 386. 
67 Sullivan, supra note 53, at 673.  
68 See id. (“[T]he First Amendment ‘does not require that, on every occasion, every citizen 
shall take part in public debate. . . . What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that 
everything worth saying shall be said.’” (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND 
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948))). 
69 Cf. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 893, 912 (1998) (comparing the externalities stemming from vote-buying to campaign 
spending). 
70 See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 5, at 1707. 
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like water, will always find an outlet.”71 This view takes aim at a central 
premise underlying campaign finance regulations: that legal restrictions can 
effectively reduce the supply of political money. Assuming that wealthy 
donors seek to have their message heard and care less about who bundles and 
spends their contributions, capping the donor/candidate or donor/party 
contribution is a farce. Political action committees, unaffiliated 527 groups, 
and other sources can receive funds and evade the regulatory scope of FECA 
and BCRA.72 As a result, contribution limits re-channel political funding to 
issue-oriented groups or political action committees that “adopt legislative 
strategies”—that is, “attempting to influence legislative votes” instead of 
“influencing election outcomes.”73 
 This criticism reflects the empirical reality of nonparty and 
noncandidate political expenditures during the most recent election cycles.74 
An equality-based justification for campaign finance regulation must recognize 
that the modern regulatory framework can only superficially reduce the impact 
of economic inequality. Unless the loopholes can be closed and the flow of 
money restricted, the benefits of regulation may only narrowly outweigh their 
costs. A meaningful reduction of inequality that overcomes these second-order 
consequences might require a much broader regulatory framework. An obvious 
response to these critics is that regulation can always go further, plugging the 
next hole where money might seep through. Beyond a certain point, though, 
genuine steps toward egalitarianism might undermine First Amendment 
protection. Against the backdrop of today’s regulatory structure, Judge 
Winter’s concern that “the goal of equality in political communication . . . 
subjects every person or group engaging in effective political communication 
to censorship” seems inapposite.75 But adequately fixing the holes in modern 
campaign finance regulations and meaningfully reducing the influence of 
wealthy donors might fulfill this very prophecy. 
 
 C. “Libertarian” Objections to Buckley 
 
                                                 
71 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003). 
72 See Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 949, 995-98 (2005) (acknowledging the challenge that unregulated 527 groups pose to 
the ideal of political equality). 
73 Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign 
Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1075 (1996). 
74 In the 2008 election, for instance, 527 advocacy groups alone received approximately $503 
million, compared to $384 million in 2006 and $600 million in 2004. See OpenSecrets.org, 
527s: Advocacy Group Spending in the 2008 Elections, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/index.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). By comparison, 
President Obama raised over $745 million, and Senator McCain over $368 million during the 
2008 cycle, see OpenSecrets.org, Banking on Becoming President, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/index.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2009), while candidates for 
the House of Representatives raised a total of over $977 million, see OpenSecrets.org, Stats at 
a Glance, http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/index.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). 
75 Winter, supra note 16, at 98. 
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 Opponents of campaign finance reform achieved only a partial victory 
in Buckley—the Court still found contribution limits appropriate for the 
government’s interest in mitigating corruption despite their impact on free 
speech values. Just as the reformers’ interest in enshrining equality values has 
persisted and adapted to the anticorruption rationale, the libertarian First 
Amendment vision has persisted in its challenges to police against further 
infringement of rights to free speech and association. This Section summarizes 
and criticizes this view. 
 The libertarian argument campaign finance reform rests on the bedrock 
principle that the First Amendment ensures the individual right to speech and 
association, which is fundamental to a functional democracy. Central to this 
right is the ability to engage in core political speech, which is necessarily 
constrained by caps on contributions and expenditures, which undermine these 
values. Appellants in Buckley raised the argument that eroded First 
Amendment protection for political speech might lead to further restrictions on 
mainstream speech.76 The Court gave this claim only partial credence, 
allowing that expenditure limits do in fact pose a threat not justified by the 
anticorruption rationale. Despite numerous Court decisions upholding 
contribution limits, the libertarian critique matured, in part due to the 
expanding pro-equality arguments in favor of overturning or restricting 
Buckley. One critic surmised that enshrining the equality rationale would 
effectively “treat freedom of speech not as an end in itself, but an instrumental 
value.”77 
 Advocates of this First Amendment vision believe that campaign 
finance limits, like other speech restraints, should be subject to strict scrutiny 
instead of the “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement [of First 
Amendment rights]” standard from Buckley.78 Justice Thomas, an advocate of 
strict scrutiny in this context, maintains that “contribution limits infringe as 
directly and as seriously upon freedom of political expression and association 
as do expenditure limits.”79 In this view, the anticorruption rationale, like the 
equality rationale, is not narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest, 
requiring a finding of unconstitutionality. Corruption is not widespread, so 
“[a]n individual’s First Amendment right is infringed whether his speech is 
decreased by 5% or 95%, and whether he suffers alone or shares his violation 
with his fellow citizens.”80 
As Bradley Smith explains, though, “the First Amendment serves both 
the libertarian goals of some reform critics and the egalitarian goals of 
reformers.”81 Critics of this conception of the First Amendment have advanced 
the alternative view that some restrictions on speech are necessary to provide 
                                                 
76 See id. at 94-95. 
77 Martin Shapiro, Corruption, Freedom, and Equality in Campaign Financing, 18 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 385, 393 (1989). 
78 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976). 
79 Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 640 (1996) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
80 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 271-72 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
81 Smith, supra note 73, at 1086. 
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mere access to public debate—itself a fundamental right.82 Many have raised 
the argument that unrestricted political donations may “eliminate the need for, 
and in that sense crowd out, smaller individual contributions.”83 Crowding out 
may occur if the volume of campaign money is so substantial that a small 
individual donation would be like a drop of water in a deluge. Raising barriers 
on contributions would render the individual right to association and 
expression devoid of meaning. The First Amendment might be better served, 
these critics argue, by paradoxically limiting speech to ensure that the forum is 
more broadly available.84 The version of strict scrutiny Justice Thomas would 
apply to individual claims of First Amendment speech violations would 
undermine the reach of First Amendment protection. This positive 
liberty/negative liberty distinction suggests, even in a modest sense, that a 
singular conception of the First Amendment fails to account adequately for the 
plurality of purposes served by the Amendment, much less the plurality of 
values advanced by campaign finance regulations. 
The libertarian conception of First Amendment rights may have a more 
solid ground than critics acknowledge, as the contribution/expenditure 
distinction has eroded in modern democratic politics.85 Opponents espousing 
the alternative First Amendment view would agree that this distinction is 
unhelpful and arguably counterproductive. The question of which post-Buckley 
world would be more desirable leads to a vast divide between pro-equality 
reformers and libertarian critics of fundraising restrictions. If neither of these 
dominant conceptions is satisfactory, and current Buckley-derived doctrine 
stands as the suboptimal middle ground, a superior animating rationale is 
necessary for the future of campaign finance reform. As this Article argues, the 
most troublesome aspect of the First Amendment absolutist conception is that 
it can threaten or dilute citizen participation in the democratic process. 
 
D. A Way Forward? The Limited Hope of Structuralism 
 
                                                 
82 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1425 
(1986) (“[U]nless the Court allows, and sometimes even requires, the state to [restrict the 
speech of some elements of society], we as a people will never truly be free.”); J. Skelly 
Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political 
Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 609 (“Campaign spending reform is imperative to serve 
the purposes of freedom of expression.”). 
83 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 39 
(2006). 
84 Another way to conceptualize this argument would be to consider the diminishing maginal 
utility of additional speech (or expenditures on speech). See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 
5, at 1708-09. If, beyond a certain threshold, political donations yield near-negligible 
additional benefits, placing a cap on contributions might do minimal individual harm while 
curbing the crowding-out effect. 
85 See Richard Briffault, WRTL and Randall: The Roberts Court and the Unsettling of 
Campaign Finance Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 807, 839-40 (2007) (explaining that the 
contribution/expenditure distinction “gives rise to a host of problems” and provides “a strategic 
opportunity for political and electoral influence for intermediaries like PACs and bundlers who 
enable candidates to deal with the fundraising problem by collecting large numbers of capped 
contributions and forwarding them to candidates”). 
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One emerging strand of election law scholarship—structuralism—
highlights the dangers posed to the political process by entrenched political 
parties and actors who do not face adequate political competition. In an 
important article, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes divert the analysis of 
democratic politics from a rights- or equality-based discussion to an inquiry 
into the structural and procedural mechanisms that threaten political 
competition.86 This structuralist paradigm is unique in that it transcends the 
boundaries of the libertarian/egalitarian debate, focusing on a value that 
arguably both sides might be willing to rally behind. Justice Scalia in 
McConnell construed this concern over BCRA stifling active competition by 
overprotecting incumbents, arguing that the “first instinct of power is the 
retention of power.”87 
Pildes rejects Justice Scalia’s contention, though, arguing that “the 
political process behind BCRA,” which obscured no invidious purpose of self-
protection, leaves such contentions purely speculative.88 Handing over to 
courts the task of “judg[ing] reliably whether a law like BCRA is 
anticompetitive in effect or to infer from the law’s effects credible conclusions 
about whether the law is anticompetitive in purpose” is a tall order.89 
Advancing this argument that “legislation that caps the flow of money into 
politics is necessarily anticompetitive”90 is akin to crafting a per-se rule 
invalidating restraints on political competition. Pildes, who helped popularize 
the political competition paradigm, recognizes its limits when applied to 
campaign finance regulations. 
The political competition paradigm arguably has gained clout in the 
Court. Justice Breyer’s analysis in Randall v. Sorrell of the Vermont 
contribution and expenditure limits found that they “magnify the advantages of 
incumbency to the point where they put challengers to a significant 
disadvantage”—that is, they were “too low and too strict to survive First 
Amendment scrutiny.91 Finding the contribution too low, the Court’s decision 
effectively grafted a structuralist analysis onto a First Amendment inquiry. 
Justice Souter’s dissent took aim at the majority’s “suspicion . . . that 
incumbents cannot be trusted to set fair limits, because facially neutral limits 
do not in fact give challengers an even break,”92 recounting empirical findings 
that offer “no support for an increased bias in favor of incumbents resulting 
from the presence of campaign limits.”93 The thrust-and-parry of empirical 
                                                 
86 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648 (1998) (advocating a more probing, or “hard 
look” scrutiny of anticompetitive mechanisms that restrict the ability of new entrants into the 
political marketplace). 
87 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88 Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of 
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 139 (2004). 
89 Id. at 136. 
90 Id. at 140. 
91 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006). 
92 Id. at 287 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. (quoting Kihong Eom & Donald A. Gross, Contribution Limits and Disparity in 
Contributions Between Gubernatorial Candidates, 59 POL. RES. Q. 99, 99 (2006)). 
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evidence concerning the effect of campaign restrictions only furthers Pildes’s 
argument that courts may be the improper forum for resolving certain 
structuralist questions. 
 The Court’s decision to overturn the Millionaire’s Amendment in Davis 
v. FEC arguably constitutes the outer bound of its institutional competency in 
limiting political entrenchment.94 Pildes previously had identified this 
provision of BCRA as low-hanging fruit: “Self-financed opponents are today’s 
incumbents’ nightmares. . . . The few successful challenges to incumbents 
often involve self-financed candidates.”95 Justice Alito’s majority decision did 
not take the opportunity to construe the amendment as a political lock-up. 
Instead, it focused on the “drag on First Amendment rights” BCRA imposes on 
self-funded candidates.96 
 Whether subsequent Supreme Court decisions embrace the structuralist 
analysis of campaign finance laws as forthrightly as the majority in Randall 
remains to be seen. The Court in Davis did not take the opportunity, but in fact 
reiterated Buckley’s rejection of the “interest in equalizing the financial 
resources of candidates.”97 The hope that structuralism, or policing against 
barriers to political competition, can guide subsequent campaign finance 
decisions is likely limited. Nor does structuralism provide a meaningful guide 
for subsequent reform policies. Asking Congress to adopt a campaign finance 
regulation that reduces incumbency protection would fall on deaf ears. 
 
II. A MODEL OF PARTICIPATION 
 
 The campaign finance stalemate has led to reform efforts that attempt 
to maximize regulatory weight without running afoul of Buckley. Lost in the 
effort to plug the holes of FECA or BCRA is an animating rationale closely 
aligned with modern democratic politics. Indeed, any vision of campaign 
finance reform must answer the first-order question of what value should be 
advanced.98 The unprecedented surge of small donations in the 2008 election 
cycle raises the possibility that future candidates may be required to appeal to a 
broad swath of the electorate—enough that they will make a donation—in 
order to stay competitive. Even if it cannot be replicated, this broad base of 
campaign donations suggests a new direction for campaign finance 
scholarship: embracing campaign contributions as a valid form of modern 
democratic participation.99 This Part seeks to provide a normative vision of 
campaign finance reform based on maximizing democratic participation. 
                                                 
94 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). 
95 Pildes, supra note 88, at 140 n.483. 
96 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772. 
97 Id. at 2773; see id. at 2774 (“Leveling electoral opportunities means making and 
implementing judgments about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the 
outcome of an election.”). 
98 See Strauss, supra note 56, at 141 (arguing that one must first identify “what the objective of 
any reform effort should be” before constructing an appropriate regulatory framework). 
99 With certain exceptions, reformers generally do not embrace this idea. As one commentator 
argues, “Individuals give to candidates for two broad reasons: first, because they back the 
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 This Part expounds on the idea of modern democratic participation as a 
counterpoint to existing theories. In particular, it takes issue with two different 
components of modern scholarship that champions participation as a value 
underlying campaign finance reform. First, it argues that the civic republican 
participatory ideal is simply inapt for modern doctrine and regulation. Second, 
it argues that seeking to equalize participation suffers the same critical flaw 
hindering most pro-equality rationales. By comparison, I advocate a 
framework that seeks to maximize, not equalize participation in the democratic 
process. By considering political contributions as central to democratic 
participation, Section II.C turns to critique existing regulations and doctrine 
that hinder this model of participation. 
 
 A. Campaign Finance and Democratic Participation 
 
 In upholding most provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 
the McConnell Court expressed a justification for campaign finance laws now 
emerging in academic literature: “[C]ontribution limits, like other measures 
aimed at protecting the integrity of the process, tangibly benefit public 
participation in political debate.”100 Democratic participation has largely been 
lost in the shuffle in most campaign finance debates. The Buckley Court placed 
the First Amendment at the forefront of judicial inquiries into whether 
regulations burden individual rights and the government interests compelling 
their enactment. As described above, the First Amendment and the 
anticorruption rationale have served as a vehicle for other public regarding 
values enhanced or burdened by campaign finance laws. Yet, as John Hart Ely 
describes, “participatory values” are those “which our Constitution has 
preeminently and most successfully concerned itself.”101 I argue that 
participation should be a greater focal point in debates over appropriate reform 
efforts and that this value is more closely aligned with the First Amendment 
than equality norms themselves. 
 The electoral process is the central conduit for individual and group 
expression of political values. Election Day is merely the tip of the iceberg in 
an election cycle, and one crucial insight of the pro-reform movement has been 
                                                                                                                                
candidate and are using the donation to mark a higher level of support for that candidate; 
second, because they want to benefit from the contribution.” Nelson, supra note 12, at 529; see 
Uri Ben-Zion & Zeev Eytan, On Money, Votes, and Policy in a Democratic Society, 17 PUB. 
CHOICE 1, 2 (1974); James M. Snyder, Jr., Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. 
House of Representatives, 1980-1986, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1195, 1197 (1990); William P. Welch, 
The Economics of Campaign Funds, 20 PUB. CHOICE 83, 85 (1974). I argue that this is a 
narrow view of contributions as well as participation itself. 
100 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Nixon v. Shrink 
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that elections are 
the fundamental “means through which a free society democratically translates political speech 
into concrete governmental action”). 
101 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75 (1980). 
John Hart Ely focused his prescriptive thesis on the Court’s ability to further participation 
based on equal protection theories. Id. at 74-75 (maintaining that the Warren Court’s decisions 
in this arena advanced “‘participational’ goals of broadened access to the process”). 
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to extend the concept of citizen franchise beyond the mere right to vote.102 
Participation in this process is crucial to democratic legitimacy, as a citizenry 
that does not engage in political issues can tend toward arbitrary rule by elites 
with little connection to societal norms.103 As Spencer Overton, one of the few 
advocates for explicitly participation-enhancing reform, explains, 
 
Widespread participation serves four primary functions. First, it 
exposes decision makers to a variety of ideas and viewpoints, 
which ensures fully informed decisions. Second, it enhances the 
legitimacy of government decisions . . . . Third, widespread 
participation allows government resources to be redistributed 
and priorities altered to reflect evolving problems and needs. 
Fourth, participation furthers the self-fulfillment and self-
definition of individual citizens who play a role in shaping the 
decisions that affect their lives.104 
 
In an idealized form, maximized participation would increase the 
responsiveness of elected representatives to the public opinion and needs, 
leaving no democratic deficit between representatives and citizens.105 
Enshrining participation as a first-order value requires a general 
understanding of which forms of participation should be advanced in a 
democratic polity.106 Campaign finance doctrine, from Buckley to more recent 
decisions, favors a civic republican conception of democratic participation. In 
the civic republican tradition, active self-government requires that citizens 
govern themselves through voting, active debate, and community 
involvement.107 This process of debate favors the active over the passive, the 
community over the individual, which results in effective democratic 
                                                 
102 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 4 (2002). 
103 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.”); BREYER, supra note 83, at 26 (explaining that 
“the legitimacy of governmental action” requires that “the people themselves should 
participate in government”) 
104 Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 101-02 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
105 Cf. Sanford Levinson, How the United States Constitution Contributes to the Democratic 
Deficit in America, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 859, 860 (“A democratic deficit occurs when ostensibly 
democratic organizations or institutions in fact fall short of fulfilling what are believed to be 
the principles of democracy.”). 
106 Overton enumerates, but does not rank explicitly, a list of activities that constitute 
participation. Overton, supra note 104, at 101 (“Participation includes but is not limited to 
voting; involvement with or financial support of a campaign, political party, issue, or interest 
group; and public activity or protest.”); see JAMES BURKHART ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 57-100 (1972). 
107 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 65 (1975) (“The political community was the 
necessary setting for such self-knowledge and the laws that were its issue . . . .”); Frank I. 
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 37-40 (1986). 
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representation. Scholars have delineated a positive liberty conception of the 
First Amendment against the backdrop of civic republicanism, as “the free 
speech principle extends to . . . self-conscious efforts to contribute to 
democratic deliberation.”108 As Gregory Magarian explains, a public rights 
theory of the First Amendment would “derive[] from a republican philosophy 
of politics and government, focused on deliberation and the public interest, as 
opposed to the pluralist philosophy that animates the private rights theory.”109 
A public or collective rights conception of the First Amendment bridges the 
gap between the civic republican ideal of participation and the modern 
framework of campaign finance regulation. Civic republicanism emphasizes 
the quality of discourse—that is, “deliberative discourse in pursuit of the 
common good.”110 Closely related, campaign finance regulations may be 
tailored to impact the quantity of discourse. Existing doctrine reflects an 
effort—albeit limited in scope—to further both of these components of 
participation. 
In Buckley, the Court found that contribution limits did not impinge 
sufficiently on First Amendment rights to speech and association to warrant 
overturning. Importantly, the Court explained that contribution limits leave 
individuals “free to engage in independent political expression, to associate 
actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but 
nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates . . . with financial 
resources.”111 In this way, contribution limits channel political involvement 
from monetary donations to active participation in the political process. By 
limiting contributions and compelling greater involvement in the political 
process, FECA was “an attempt to expand participation . . . . seeing the 
political process as a battle of ideas, informed by values—as the means by 
which the citizens apply their intelligence to the making of hard public 
choices.”112 In upholding contribution limits, the Court endorses direct 
volunteering and other involvement as an appropriate substitute or proxy for 
political speech. 
Subsequent decisions have endorsed the primacy of direct citizen 
involvement over campaign contributions.113 The majority decision in Randall 
v. Sorrell is illustrative.114 Among other provisions, Vermont’s campaign 
finance law did not exclude volunteer expenses from its definition of campaign 
contributions, which “ma[de] it more difficult for individuals to associate in 
                                                 
108 Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 259 (1992). 
109 Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First 
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1980 (2003); id. at 1982 (“[E]xpressive freedom 
under the public rights theory is collective, rather than individuated.”). 
110 Gregory P. Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First Amendment Interests: From the 
Dead End of Neutrality to the Open Road of Participation-Enhancing Review, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 185, 260 (2007). 
111 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976). 
112 Wright, supra note 61, at 1017-18 (emphasis added). 
113 See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 614-15 (1996) 
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28). 
114 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
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this way.”115 The Court found that this provision was not narrowly tailored to 
justify “hamper[ing] participation” and violated the First Amendment.116 By 
contrast, Vermont’s contribution limits—markedly lower than other states with 
similar laws—themselves were not considered excessively burdensome on 
rights to speech or association. Rather, their danger lay in the burden placed on 
challenges to incumbent office holders.117 Juxtaposing these two provisions 
and their effects, it is clear that the majority viewed restraints on direct 
political involvement as more severe than the burden on speech (or the ability 
to purchase speech).118 As I argue in the next Section, this doctrinal posture is 
questionable from the perspective of maximizing participation. 
Reformers who have embraced participation-enhancement as an ideal 
for campaign finance reform have largely focused on measures that equalize 
political involvement. Ronald Dworkin considers equal participation a central 
component of citizen equality, extrapolating from the “settled” principle that 
“all mature citizens, with very few exceptions, should have equal voting 
impact.”119 Efforts to control campaign spending are justifiable in furtherance 
of this end. Dworkin also advances the secondary point that “the power of 
money in politics” has “sunk [public participation in politics] below the level 
at which we can claim, with a straight face, to be governing ourselves.”120 This 
two-pronged argument for participatory values in campaign finance 
regulation—equalization and maximization of total participants—bears a 
strong resemblance to existing pro-equality arguments and favors the narrow 
view of participation. 
Other scholars focus less explicitly on perfecting equality, but instead 
seek to reduce the impact of inequality on political participation.121 This 
perspective tends to ignore the call for perfect equality in electoral influence, 
favoring instead that reforms “increase participation by smaller contributors in 
each election cycle.”122 This more modest argument for participation-
enhancement is concerned more with the externalities resulting from social 
inequalities than perfecting equality itself, echoing Justice Breyer’s argument 
that campaign restrictions can “democratize the influence that money itself 
may bring to bear on the electoral process.”123 Importantly, Breyer’s point 
                                                 
115 Id. at 260. 
116 Id. at 261-62. 
117 See id. at 248; supra text accompanying notes 91-93. 
118 See also Ken I. Kersch, Justice Breyer’s Mandarin Liberty, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 776 
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technocratic) legal process idiom” in his book Active Liberty). 
119 RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 364 
(2002). 
120 Id. at 369. 
121 See Overton, supra note 104, at 105 (“The goal of campaign reform should be to reduce the 
impact of disparities of wealth on the ability of different groups of citizens to participate in 
politics.”). 
122 Id. at 106. Overton argues that “contributions of $100 or less should account for 75% of the 
money raised by average candidates, parties, and PACs.” Id. 
123 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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contrasts with existing arguments that “the Government has an important 
interest in leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the cost of 
federal campaigns,” which would “free candidates and their staffs from the 
interminable burden of fund-raising.”124 The participation-enhancing goal 
would applaud increased efforts to reach a broader base of public support.125 
This perspective nevertheless views inequality as an instrumental harm to the 
political process and increased participation as a second-best remedy. Overton, 
who espouses this view, comes close to equating contributions with 
participation, as he advocates tax credits to broaden the base of donors in the 
political process.126 
Recognizing the overlap of contributions and participation is an 
important step forward, but this view is difficult to reconcile with the 
persistence of hard caps. In effect, by calling for continued limits on 
contributions, his egalitarian-participation model does little more than “restrict 
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative 
voice of others.”127 This effort would broaden, but not enhance, democratic 
participation. I argue that a participation model should be freed from these 
egalitarian moorings and should embrace a second prong—enhancing 
participation. 
 
B. Maximizing Modern Democratic Participation 
 
The increasing calls for democratic participation as a rationale to justify 
campaign finance regulation unquestionably improve on the conventional 
divide between libertarian and egalitarian conceptions of the First Amendment. 
These proposals, in many ways, are closely analogous to existing arguments 
that the government serves a compelling interest by equalizing resources and 
influence on the political process. I argue that this perspective is only half 
right. Campaign regulation and doctrine should seek not only to increase the 
total number of participants in the political process, but also to maximize the 
efficacy of participation among those who choose to part in the process. 
Central to this proposition is recognizing that contributions operate as a form 
of modern political participation, and that the civic republican conception of 
democratic discourse hinders the participatory ideal more than it helps. 
 
 1. Modern Participation Versus Civic Republicanism 
 
The civic republican model of democratic participation, as embodied in 
scholarship and doctrine, favors direct involvement over more passive forms of 
participation. This conception is misleading, however. As recent election 
                                                 
124 Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 649 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
125 Cf. Sullivan, supra note 25, at 312 (arguing that campaign contribution limits require 
candidates to “seek contributions from a larger number of donors,” which requires “spending a 
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126 Overton, supra note 104, at 108-13. 
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cycles demonstrate, money and participation are closely intertwined and 
mutually enabling. Donations serve both as expressive acts and forms of 
participation in the political process. This dual nature of political contributions 
is best understood by contrast to the civic republican conception of 
participation. 
Democratic deliberation in the early Republic was crucially linked to 
First Amendment protection because public debate and discourse was the 
primary means of self-expression. In this era, direct public involvement was 
the pinnacle of participation because (1) it was the most cost-effective method 
of public participation, and (2) it was the only available means of self-
expression and association. This standard no longer reflects the modern reality 
of political involvement. The personal tradeoffs facing the modern family 
make participation in the narrow civic republican sense both impractical and 
inefficient. Opportunity costs to volunteering are more substantial—a two-
income family might not have spare time to work a phone bank, but they might 
be highly effective in donating to a campaign that employs active callers. 
Recognizing that volunteering and engaging in public discourse has a high cost 
and limited effectiveness, campaign contributions often stand as the most 
effective means of participating in the political process.128 One might contend 
that the rise of money in politics can be explained in part as a function of 
declining spare time among working professionals still seeking to participate. 
In this way, capping campaign donations compels a choice that dramatically 
increases the cost of effective participation. 
 Contributions similarly act to channel individual expression and 
association. Reformers object to likening the contribution to a form of 
expression, which is difficult to measure because, for example, a $100 
donation to an impoverished individual may be profoundly more personally 
meaningful than a $100 (or even $1000) donation by a wealthy individual.129 
This critique is well-considered, but unavailing. That one cannot measure the 
intensity of expression embodied by an individual donation does not justify 
placing caps on this method of participation. Rather, it might suggest the 
opposite, that removing caps is more appropriate for preventing individual 
restraints on political expression. Once individuals contribute up to the 
statutory maximum, their remaining options are to contribute to less 
accountable political action committees without fundraising limits or to 
directly participate themselves. This tradeoff highlights the problematic nature 
of the civic republican participatory ideal. Modern direct participation in the 
civic republican sense is less effective and more costly today than ever before. 
One who devotes his or her time to participate directly—through volunteering, 
joining an issue advocacy group, or protesting—is less effective in the digital 
age of online campaigning absent unique knowledge of the process. In 
addition, the cost of participation—the income-earning or other activities one 
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must forego to participate directly—is substantially higher. Bruce Ackerman 
and Ian Ayres recognize “the positive role that private giving plays in the 
American culture of active citizenship,” but their conception views 
contributions as a means to a civic republican end.130 Campaign donations 
merely “empower” Americans, who “become citizens only through 
engagement in a much broader cultural enterprise.”131 
 The presence of caps on contributions stifles one’s ability to participate 
effectively and efficiently in the political process, and it hinders whatever 
expressive component that contributions might carry. As an animating 
principle or guiding value for campaign finance reformers, contribution caps 
are inherently suspect unless one’s goal is to equalize participation across the 
population. 
 
  2. Maximizing Participation 
 
 The foregoing analysis advanced the premise that democratic 
participation should accept campaign donations as a valid and legitimate form 
of political expression on par with direct participation. Contribution caps 
necessarily hinder this form of participation in favor of an antiquated notion of 
participation in the political process. I argue, by extension, that the goal of 
campaign finance reform and doctrine should be to maximize democratic 
participation, both as a matter of widening the base of individuals who 
participate in the political process and heightening the effectiveness through 
which participation may occur. This dual-maximization goal is not explicitly 
utilitarian—it does not suggest that one person doubling her participation is 
equally valuable as adding another person exerting the same level of 
participation.132 Campaign finance laws should both expand the pool of 
participants and reduce the barriers to individuals who do participate in the 
political process. In other words, reformers should seek to broaden the playing 
field, but they should not seek to level it. These two prongs—broadening and 
enhancing participation—form the dual methods for maximizing participation. 
 Scholars have placed these two methods of participation-enhancement 
in direct tension with each other. If, as reformers suggest, the public worries 
“that the few who give in large amounts . . . create the appearance of undue 
influence,” then it may “lose confidence in the political system and become 
less willing to participate.”133 In this manner, maximizing the participation of 
one segment of society would dilute the participation of another segment, 
leading to certain groups opting out of political engagement entirely. This 
wisdom is largely taken for granted in the campaign finance literature, that 
unconstrained contributions reduce public confidence in electoral politics, 
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which in turn reduces participation itself.134 The empirics backing this claim 
are tenuous; in fact, the 2008 recent election suggests that small donations may 
be wholly unrelated to disenchantment with the corrupting influence of large 
contributions.135 One recent study, which points to similar findings in the 
empirical literature, concludes that “one of the key rationales for these 
reforms—decreasing perceptions of corruption—is not borne out by this 
research.”136 Even if the 2008 election’s spike in mobilization and small 
money-donations becomes a historical anomaly, it serves as a striking 
counterexample that calls into question this prevailing wisdom.137 
 The crucial point is that individual participation, unlike voting, is not a 
binary measure. Reducing the tension between broadness of participation and 
intensity offers a step beyond the existing equality paradigm, which justifies 
participation only to the extent that voices are heard proportionally by 
government decision makers. This skeptical posture toward contribution limits 
does not suggest that this participatory framework embraces the same 
normative conclusions as the libertarian conception of First Amendment rights. 
To be sure, the right to participate in the electoral process is not 
constitutionally enshrined beyond voting rights themselves, but participation 
does provide the vehicle through which First Amendment values of speech and 
association may be expressed. 
The participation-maximization model I advocate does not point 
squarely in the direction of deregulation. The two goals—broadening the total 
number of citizens who participate and enhancing the effectiveness of their 
participation—caution some limits. Without some limits, the flood of 
contributions would reduce politicians’ incentives to appeal broadly to new 
participants, and they would dilute the efficacy of existing efforts to 
participate. This conception endorses neither the pro-regulation egalitarians’ 
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nor the First Amendment libertarians’ model of regulation. Instead, it urges 
genuine innovation. In this spirit, Part III unpacks the argument that such laws 
should maximize total participants and the intensity of their participation by 
analyzing the status quo and various reform proposals. Part IV provides an 
original proposal that would require only partial modification of the status quo 
regulatory regime. 
 
III. ANALYZING CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATIONS UNDER THE 
PARTICIPATORY MODEL 
 
 Campaign finance reformers have spilt almost as much ink 
contemplating how to modify or improve upon existing regulations as they 
have in crafting constitutional justifications for dethroning Buckley v. Valeo. 
Yet neither the status quo nor these competing reform proposals fare well 
under the model of maximizing citizen participation laid out in Part II. First, I 
describe how existing regime of campaign regulation hinders effective 
participation in the political process. Next, I consider the regulatory outcomes 
likely to prevail if Buckley were overturned outright and their impact on 
participation. Both the libertarian First Amendment and egalitarian conceptions 
offer weak alternatives to the present system of regulation. Finally, I consider 
the possibility of direct public funding proposals recently offered that might 
broaden, but not enhance, citizen participation. 
 
A. Restricting Participation Under the Federal Election Campaign Act 
 
 The modern federal campaign finance regime is a direct byproduct of 
the outer limits traced by the Court in Buckley, which created the 
contribution/expenditure distinction still alive in today’s doctrine.138 As of 
2009, contributions by individuals are limited to $2400 to a federal candidate 
per election, and up to $5000 per calendar year to “political committees.”139 
Political action committees and national party committees may contribute 
$5000 to each candidate per election,140 and coordinated expenditure limits 
restrict these committees from bypassing this statutory limit.141 Expenditure 
limits for candidates are no longer valid, following Buckley, and candidates 
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may voluntarily accept public funding.142 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 amended FECA to close several loopholes, such as “banning 
national party committees from raising or spending soft money (funds not 
subject to the limitations, prohibitions and disclosure requirements of the 
federal campaign finance law).”143 
 This federal legal framework, followed by the states (with some 
variation on contribution limits),144 largely hinders the effectiveness of public 
participation in the political process. The previous Section explained that an 
ideal regulatory framework both would broaden and strengthen public 
participation. FECA serves neither of these goals. First, contribution limits 
urge a narrow form of participation once they meet their contribution limits. If 
an individual in a given election year maxes out her $2400 contribution, she 
faces a new choice. She may either contribute to a political action committee 
or party committee, or she must find a way to participate directly. If she 
chooses the former option, the contribution cap allows a party or political 
committee to co-opt her donation. Unless her ideology matches this group’s 
central goals, the donation’s expressive component is transformed or diluted. 
The latter option might be less desirable—joining a campaign, creating or 
posting to a blog, or shouting from the rooftops can only accomplish so 
much.145 Unless the contributor has intellectual capital to contribute, her 
effectiveness will be lower than what a monetary contribution would 
provide.146 In this manner, contribution caps present the donor with an 
unfortunate choice: she must sacrifice the expressive value of additional 
participation, or she must limit the effectiveness of her additional participation. 
And, to the extent that contributing to political action committees serves as a 
substitute for direct participation, questions of accountability, “shadow” 
corruption, and manipulation of the political process may result.147 
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 Existing campaign finance laws provide few incentives to broaden 
democratic participation. Overton argues that “[t]he goal of campaign finance 
reform should be to reduce the impact of disparities in wealth on the ability of 
different groups of citizens to participate in politics.”148 The second prong of 
this Article’s participation-maximization model embraces a similar, but 
modified posture. Broadening participation is normatively desirable as an end 
in itself, not merely to the extent that it curbs the second-order effects of 
inequality. Under this conception, any citizen’s decision to participate in the 
political process, whether through a $10 donation or a ten-hour get-out-the-
vote effort, is intrinsically desirable. The task of evaluating campaign finance 
policies and reforms through this lens is relatively straightforward. In many 
ways, the existing federal framework is misguided. One common argument 
among reformers is that contribution or expenditure limits would limit the 
fundraising arms race, ameliorating the “grim business of soliciting donations” 
that “forces candidates to meet with potential contributors.”149 However 
distasteful this process may be, it still provides a conduit between future voters 
and their elected representatives. Currently structured campaign finance laws 
may be ill-suited to the task, but regulations that encourage politicians to cast a 
wider net should be welcomed. Some states have provided tax incentives, such 
as credits or deductions for political donations,150 to bring in a broader 
subsection of the population. BCRA, by comparison, seized the historical 
moment to close loopholes in FECA instead of opening windows to encourage 
participation. 
 
 B. Regulation After Buckley’s Demise 
 
 As Part I explored, a portion of the current Supreme Court is willing to 
overturn Buckley, though on precisely opposite grounds. Unless either side of 
this divide is ascendant, the center of gravity will only deviate slightly from the 
body of precedent interpreting the constraints of Buckley. One side would 
construe contribution limits as invalid under the First Amendment and the 
other would permit even expenditure restrictions based on compelling 
government interests in substantially reducing the influence of wealthy donors. 
From the democratic participation perspective, neither argument would lead to 
a satisfying enhancement or broadening of participation. 
 
  1. Invalidating Contribution Limits 
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Consider Justice Thomas’s argument that if strict scrutiny were applied 
to existing contribution caps, regulations not narrowly tailored to a compelling 
government interest would be held invalid. Following this analysis, the Court 
would overturn Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,151 which permitted 
limitations on corporate expenditures,152 and Buckley, which permitted 
individual contribution limits.153 FECA would largely fall by the wayside, 
taking BCRA’s soft-money loophole restrictions with it. The First Amendment 
conception, reviled by reformers as “an untenable distortion of . . . the 
democratic process that has torn the fabric of democracy—public trust—into a 
thousand pieces,”154 would enshrine the libertarian vision over “popular 
sovereignty.”155 Setting aside the possibility that a libertarian vision might 
severely undermine pro-reformers’ hopes for achieving equality in the electoral 
process, the individual speech right would be unrestrained. “Money is not 
speech,”156 to be certain, but restraints on the ability to communicate 
effectively would be swept away. 
Democratic participation, as described in Part II, may only improve 
marginally. Removing contribution limits would substantially increase the 
supply of political money, and may even lead to a prisoner’s dilemma between 
major candidates battling to out-fundraise each other.157 If increasing one’s 
ability to contribute to major political candidates widens one’s ability to 
participate meaningfully and effectively in the political process, this state of 
affairs might maximize individual participation. But this enhancement might 
be only be marginal. As Overton explains, large campaign contributions 
originate in a narrow subset of the population—what he terms “the donor 
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class.”158 If one’s propensity to contribute is a function of income or wealth, 
drawing contribution limits progressively higher would reduce the number of 
individuals whose participation is enhanced. Only if viewed in isolation is this 
outcome normatively defensible based on the enhancement prong of the 
participatory model. 
Two factors, however, suggest that removing contribution ceilings 
entirely would have an adverse affect on participation. First, the incentive 
effect on first-time contributors would likely be net-negative. Unless federal 
regulation provided some inducement to contribute or directly participate, or 
politicians’ demand for new donors skyrocketed, the “crowding out” effect159 
would likely diminish the number of citizens who participate in the political 
process.160 Second, removing contribution limits might weaken the efficacy of 
participation among those who do make contributions. The expressive and 
associational component of contributing to one’s candidate of choice would be 
unrestrained, but a flood of political money could dilute this participation. 
Under the framework set out above, if contribution limits are removed and the 
donations to one’s candidate of choice increase twofold, one’s donation would 
have to increase twofold as well to achieve the same impact.161 Though some 
individuals may be able to increase their donations proportionally as total 
political money rises, others may hit their budget constraint. In sum, the 
dilution of one subgroup’s contributions might offset the enhancement of 
another’s. Both of these effects suggest that reduced participation might be one 
externality resulting from unrestraint contributions, perhaps failing both the 
broadening and enhancement prongs of the participatory model. Maximizing 
participation, in turn, requires certain limits on the volume of contributions. 
The libertarian First Amendment vision would fall short in this regard. 
 
 2. Upholding Expenditure Limits (and Reducing Contribution 
Limits) 
 
                                                 
158 Overton, supra note 104, at 105 (“While only 13.4% of American households earned at 
least $100,000 in 2000, one study showed that . . . 93.3% of $1000 contributions came from 
such households.”). 
159 BREYER, supra note 83, at 39. 
160 This argument also acknowledges that the campaign finance structure is one of many 
nonexclusive influences on participation. A possible means through which direct participation 
might increase as a result of removing contribution limits would be if a market for paid 
“volunteers” employs a substantial percentage of otherwise nonparticipating citizens. Barack 
Obama’s campaign, heralded for its impact on mobilizing direct participation and support, 
spent just under $60 million on salaries and benefits, and under $8 million on consultants’ fees. 
See OpenSecrets, Expenditures Breakdown, Barack Obama, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/expend.php?cycle=2008&cid=n00009638 (last visited Mar. 
10, 2009). 
161 For simplicity, this analysis assumes that the marginal utility of money is constant, though 
the basic point—that one’s donation is diluted as other donations pile up—still remains. See 
ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 
54-55 (1995) (discussing the marginal utility of wealth). 
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 Overturning Buckley and rejecting the libertarian conception of the 
First Amendment would permit heavy restrictions on campaign 
contributions162 and would consider expenditure limitations under a much 
lighter standard of scrutiny.163 Members of the Court have expressed 
willingness to recognize a compelling government interest in enacting 
“[q]uantity limitations” on expenditures.164 Without delving further into the 
constitutional merits of the this argument, I argue that the campaign finance 
regime likely to result is far from ideal under the participatory model. 
 The contribution/expenditure distinction, critics argue, has led to 
supply-side constraints on campaign money without addressing candidate 
demand.165 Without proper checks on candidate spending, fundraising will 
remain a central priority among incumbents and challengers, and 
unaccountable political action committees and 527 groups will remain 
prominent in democratic politics.166 The solution, then, would be to 
aggressively limit campaign expenditures and require 527 organizations to 
register with the FEC as political committees subject to similar regulations.167 
The first solution would limit candidate demand for contributions, and the 
second would limit the flow of political money to third parties not subject to 
regulation. Campaign reform skeptics have noted that the efficacy of such 
regulations might be undermined by the “hydraulic” phenomenon that 
“political money, like water, has to go somewhere.”168 Such regulations may 
even heighten the externalities associated with political money by decreasing 
accountability and increasing corruption. Assuming that the outlets can be 
plugged and post-Buckley courts adopt a deferential stance toward regulation, 
however, a more strict system of regulation might hamper, not enhance, citizen 
participation. 
 First, if political contributions are a valid and legitimate form of 
participation, existing contribution limits constrain participation and present 
donors with the choice between channeling their expression to another 
organization or participating in a much less effective manner.169 Egalitarians 
contend that limiting the influence of wealthy donors on the political process 
                                                 
162 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 281 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
163 See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2779 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding 
Congress’s limitation on candidate self-funding in the Millionaire’s Amendment as an 
“eminently reasonable scheme” that should “survive[] constitutional scrutiny”). 
164 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
165 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 12, at 550 (proffering “demand-side proposals” that would 
“attack[] the candidates’ incentive to take money”). 
166 See Briffault, supra note 72, at 965-68 (discussing the interconnection between 527 
organizations and parties). 
167 In recent years, the FEC has adopted rules attempting to limit the scope of 527 influence, 
and its enforcement actions have closely gauged the public communications in which the 
groups engaged. See generally Paul S. Ryan, 527s in 2008: The Past, Present, and Future of 
527 Organization Political Activity Regulation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 471 (discussing the 
FEC’s treatment of 527 organizations subsequent to the enactment of BCRA). 
168 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 5, at 1708. 
169 See supra text accompanying notes 144-147. 
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would improve self-government and representativeness.170 As Fred 
Wertheimer and Susan Weiss Manes argue, “There is an inherent problem with 
a system in which individuals and groups with an interest in government 
decisions can give substantial sums of money to elected officials who have the 
power to make those decisions.”171 The participatory model rejects this notion. 
Any individual with an interest in government decisions should be able to 
participate in democratic politics, whether through contributions or direct 
volunteering, and campaign regulations limiting the choice of form limit 
participation’s efficacy. Mitigating inequality is an important interest, but 
enshrining this value necessarily entails limiting participation. If the 
opportunity cost of direct participation is too high and the effectiveness of 
participation too low, citizens may opt out or find an alternative (but less 
effective) means of channeling their interest in government decisions. Further 
limiting contributions levels may take us one small step closer to achieving 
equality, but at the cost of diminishing individual ability to participate. 
 Concurrently limiting expenditures does not improve matters. The most 
ambitious egalitarian reform agenda, which would extend regulation of 
campaign expenditures to 527 groups as well as individuals,172 would place a 
cap on candidate demand for contributions. Such reforms may further goals of 
substantive equality, but a reduction in demand for participation will reduce its 
overall quantity. Given the limited efficacy of volunteering and the opportunity 
cost it entails, direct participation likely will not fill the void left by 
dramatically reduced contributions. This Article adopts the premise that direct 
participation and campaign contributions are equally valid. Even if one argues 
that contributions are inferior forms of participation, such a reduction in 
quantity may not be offset by the “superior” form of civic republican 
participation.173 The goal of limiting expenditures in the pursuit of equality 
stands at odds with the model of participation-maximization. Neither the pro-
reform egalitarian conception nor the libertarian conception of campaign 
finance offers a satisfactory method of increasing or enhancing citizen 
participation in the democratic process. The binary choice offered by the 
current divide over Buckley accentuates the need for meaningful regulatory 
innovation. 
 
                                                 
170 See DWORKIN, supra note 119, at 375-76 (“[C]itizen equality in politics is so central to the 
Constitution’s overall conception of democracy that the First Amendment must recognize that 
improving equality is sometimes a compelling reason for government regulation.”). 
171 Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring 
the Health of Our Democracy, in THE CONSTITUTION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: AN 
ANTHOLOGY 159, 161 (Frederick G. Slabach ed., 2d ed. 2006). 
172 This agenda necessarily follows from the “equal-dollars-per-voter” proposal advanced by 
Edward Foley, who argues that such a principle requires that “voters would not be permitted to 
use their own personal funds to make independent expenditures. . . . This principle requires 
that all individuals start with the same amount and that no outside funds be introduced into the 
system.” Foley, supra note 53, at 1208. 
173 See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 83, at 26 (“Participation is most forceful when it is direct, 
involving, for example, voting, town meetings, political party membership, or issue- or 
interest-related activities.” (emphasis added)). 
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 C. Public Funding of Voters 
 
 Under FECA, candidates may accept public funding conditional on 
spending limits imposed under the Act.174 Public funding can alleviate the 
demand for individual contributions in a given political cycle, though major 
candidates may reject this provision.175 Critics have assailed modern public 
financing provisions as “insufficient to run a modern campaign” while 
“creat[ing] tremendous incentives for illicit behavior that in turn makes the 
problem of monitoring circumvention legally and politically problematic.”176 
To overcome this problem, campaign finance scholars have offered a number 
of innovations that would replace or supplement this scheme by providing 
public funding to voters, not just candidates. These proposals share the method 
of “marry[ing] the egalitarian ideals of the ballot box and the flexible response 
of the marketplace.”177 Though these proposals offer a distinct advantage over 
existing regulations, they come with their own drawbacks. 
Public funding of voters would operate much like a government tax 
rebate. Rick Hasen has advocated a “voucher program” in which “the 
government provides every voter a voucher for each bi-annual federal 
election.”178 Similarly, Robert Bauer has proposed a voucher program in which 
voucher amounts “range in total value, with a large sum of money allocated to 
registered voters, and still larger sums of vouchers issued to ‘regular voters,’ 
who have voted in both primary and general presidential elections in the last 
two election cycles.”179 These differences in values would encourage higher 
voting participation.180 Ian Ayres and Bruce Ackerman’s “Patriot Dollars” 
proposal would provide a “secret donation booth” in which every American 
would be entitled to “vote” a modest sum to a candidate or organization of 
their choice.181 Like Bauer’s, this proposal aims to stimulate “civic 
engagement” in the political process among those “who want to do more than 
simply defend [their] favored cause and candidate in casual conversation and 
vote for him on election day.”182 
                                                 
174 See 26 U.S.C. § 9003(b)-(c) (2000). 
175 See, e.g., Michael Muskal, Obama Rejects Public Financing for Campaign; McCain 
Attacks Decision, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2008 (discussing then-Senator Obama’s decision not to 
receive public funding, which made him “the first major party candidate to drop out of the 
system since it began after the Watergate scandal”). 
176 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 5, at 1735; see also Editorial, Public Funding on the 
Ropes, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008 (arguing that even if public financing is not “broken,” 
Obama should “make public financing reform a high priority”). 
177 ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 102, at 25. 
178 Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice 
Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1996). 
179 Robert F. Bauer, Going Nowhere, Slowly: The Long Struggle over Campaign Finance 
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181 ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 102, at 93. 
182 Id. at 33. 
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Voucher programs are a powerful method of increasing citizen 
participation and democratizing influence over the political process. The 
participatory model expounded in Part II generally would embrace these 
measures as superior to contribution or expenditure limits. If each registered 
voter had a small sum at his or her disposal to donate to their favored candidate 
or cause, politicians would be unable to ignore the “variety of ideas and 
viewpoints” that emerge from voters outside the “donor class.”183 Ackerman 
and Ayres also argue that voucher programs would have a multiplier effect of 
sorts on citizen participation: an individual’s subsidized donation may 
encourage deliberation over who should receive the voucher, and it may 
encourage individuals to donate their own funds to their favored candidate.184 
A voucher program unquestionably would fulfill the broadening prong 
of the participatory model, though its impact on participation enhancement is 
more ambiguous. First, the multiplier effect on participation and civic 
involvement is not guaranteed, it and may even work in the opposite direction. 
In particular, vouchers may lead individuals to substitute out of their own 
personal contributions. If money and participation were one in the same, this 
substitution would be net-neutral. But participation is more robust than one’s 
ability to earmark a $50 certificate or $100 coupon for their political candidate 
or organization of choice. Such a subsidy makes an otherwise nuanced and 
meaningful personal choice—how to effectively and efficiently allocate one’s 
hard-earned money—to a more effortless decision. Once an individual $100 
dollar contribution is obviated, so too is the incentive to inform oneself about 
who should receive it. John Ferejohn notes that, at its worst, a subsidy might 
replicate “the familiar problem[] of . . . underinvestment in information,” made 
worse by “ideological groups that will likely dominate the new landscape.”185 
Ferejohn’s concern may be overly cynical, but the baseline concern remains 
salient that individuals would have little reason to overcome their own 
ambivalence.186 
Second, and closely related, vouchers may dilute or reduce individual 
expression. The Ackerman/Ayres proposal, for example, would produce a 
“flooding effect” by ensuring a ratio in which “Patriot dollars will constitute at 
least two-thirds of the overall funds available to candidates.”187 If a substantial 
proportion of earmarked small-donation coupons originate from the 
uninformed and unmotivated electorate that Ferejohn fears might dominate, 
                                                 
183 Overton, supra note 104, at 101. 
184 ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 102, at 33-34. 
185 John Ferejohn, Playing with House Money: Patriot Dollars Considered, 91 CAL. L. REV. 
685, 689 (2003); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Elections and Change Under Voting with Dollars, 
91 CAL. L. REV. 705, 716 (2003) (“[I]n a Patriot dollar world, the donation booth may 
undercut, rather than contribute to, intelligent and informed voter choice.”). 
186 One objection that Ackerman and Ayres anticipate is that ambivalence might lead to a 
“vibrant black market” where some might sell their Patriot Dollars to the highest bidder. 
ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 102, at 67. In their view, this obstacle may be overcome 
through effective institutional design, but additional safeguards arguably limit their proposal’s 
simplicity and feasibility. 
187 Karlan, supra note 185, at 714; see ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 102, at 218-19. 
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meaningful personal contributions would be drowned out by imprudent ones. 
Without capping overall donations, the dilution effect would operate in the 
same manner as under a regime without contribution limits.188 Hasen’s 
proposal, by comparison, would “equalize[] political capital . . . . [b]y 
providing each citizen with equal resources” to contribute to candidates or 
political groups.189 Provided that loopholes can be closed and the influence of 
tax-exempt political action committees curtailed, this dilution problem might 
be mitigated. The information incentive problem, however, would increase in 
severity, effectively removing any incentive for self-education. Limiting the 
supply of political money exclusively to vouchers would strip this form of 
participation of its expressive function. Equality of political influence would 
result in hollow political participation.190 An egalitarian-based voucher system 
is only weakly compatible with the notion of participation enhancement. 
These voucher proposals each carry the ability to broaden (or even 
enhance) participation, but they suffer the same basic trapping—namely, that a 
subsidy does not produce the same effect as an incentive. By receiving a 
subsidy, one can earmark it to a candidate with little afterthought. The 
recipient has no need to sacrifice time, money, or thought to who should 
receive the donation. To accept subsidies-turned-contributions as a meaningful 
form of participation is a tall order, and allowing the government to regulate 
this valve is even more dubious. Participation is most meaningful if occurring 
endogenously, from the ground up rather than by government grant.191 The 
voucher movement offers a step forward, to be sure, but is suboptimal from the 
perspective of maximizing participation. Public participation is better elicited 
through incentives, not mere subsidies, because incentives (1) ensure that 
decisions on how to allocate one’s personal funds are well-considered, and (2) 
lower the prohibitive costs of participating in the political process. The next 
Part sets forth a framework for providing incentives for participation through 
political contributions that meets both the broadening and enhancement prongs 
of the participatory model. 
 
IV. CAMPAIGN FINANCE CAP AND TRADE 
 
                                                 
188 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. Bauer’s argument for vouchers echoes the 
Ackerman/Ayres proposal, as he suggests that “resources provided should not be a pretext for 
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189 Hasen, supra note 178, at 28. 
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best if reserved for the implementation stage. For a cautionary take on public financing of 
campaigns, see Bradley A. Smith, Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded Political 
Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1999). 
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 Political participation is an elusive concept. Not only is it difficult to 
quantify, but also it can be understood more by what restrains it than what 
encourages it. This Article has modified the existing libertarian First 
Amendment critique of restraints on speech and expression to evaluate both 
existing regulatory structures and proposed reforms. Through this analysis, two 
points become apparent that caution any efforts to design participation-
maximizing campaign finance policy. First, the externalities of political money 
lend themselves to no easy consensus definition. Fundamentally different 
conceptions of participation, First Amendment rights, and our civic tradition 
inform competing notions of campaign money that account for the tension 
reflected in the modern Buckley divide. Second, policies designed both to 
broaden and enhance participation must rest on an incentive device, not 
subsidies. Incentives ensure that participation is not merely a binary measure, 
and they can elicit meaningful activity by reducing the opportunity cost of 
direct participation. Indeed, recent reform proposals are commendable to the 
extent they embrace visions of citizen participation central to our self-
governing tradition. 
This Part advances a “cap and trade” proposal that builds upon the 
strengths of competing proposals while minimizing their problematic features. 
Though the ideal participation-maximizing campaign finance policy may be 
elusive, the cap and trade model offers advantages over existing methods of 
regulation. Section IV.A describes the basic functioning of the cap and trade 
mechanism as applied to pollution, and Section IV.B applies its theoretical 
framework to campaign finance, arguing for a “tradable permits” system that 
provides incentives for contributing. Section IV.C discusses an alternative 
mechanism—a tax on political donations—that carries many of the same 
attributes of the cap and trade proposal, but concludes that is a suboptimal 
choice for regulating campaign money. Section IV.D considers various 
counterarguments to this mechanism and posits that campaign finance cap and 
trade suffers few of the same trappings that accompany existing regulations 
and proposed reforms. 
 
 A. Cap and Trade in Environmental Economics 
 
 A system of “cap and trade,” known more formally as “tradable 
permits,” is a mechanism originating from environmental economics and put 
into practice by federal and local environmental regulation agencies. Put 
briefly, a cap and trade system allocates an initial permit or quota of pollution 
output to individual emitters that can be traded among firms. The cap and trade 
system has gained currency internationally, and many scholars advocate it as a 
mechanism to mitigate global climate change.192 This Section explains the 
                                                 
192 For a general overview of cap and trade mechanisms and an explanation of how an 
international agreement might help mitigate climate change, see RICHARD B. STEWART & 
JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY (2003). For an overview of the 
normative issues involved in a global system of emissions reduction, see Eric A. Posner & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565 (2008). 
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underlying theory and practice of this system, highlighting its benefits and 
drawbacks. 
 The cap and trade mechanism begins with the assumption that pollution 
emissions create externalities “that cause harms and welfare losses to the 
public, not captured in the profit and loss statements of emitters.”193 
Monitoring each pollution-emitting industrial firm would entail substantial 
regulatory costs, and creating individually tailored emission reduction schemes 
would be prohibitive.194 Ideally, a regulator would be able to provide 
incentives for emission reduction for each company, based on their outputs, 
productive capacities, and technological ability to control emissions. But given 
the costs of direct regulation, a more efficient approach is to decentralize the 
system of incentives to firms themselves. Put into operation, 
 
the government allocates tradable permits to emitters that 
reduce prevailing or historical pollution levels. The emitters . . . 
are free to trade permits, bank them, or choose control 
measures. The government collects a permit for each unit of 
pollution emitted and monitors and enforces market rules, but 
allows emitters to make the micro-control and permit portfolio 
decisions. . . . leading to control costs typically below those of 
centralized regulation.195 
 
 Providing each polluter a permit or quota can directly curb emissions. 
For example, if the regulator hopes to cut emissions by 5% in a given year, it 
would allocate a permit to each firm at 95% of the prior year’s emissions 
output. Firms allocated permits would have several options. First, they can take 
innovative measures to reduce their output and avoid passing their quota and 
facing sanctions. Second, they can purchase pollution permits from other 
emitters who do not expect to meet their quota or have taken measures to 
reduce their emissions. Third, if they are able to reduce their emissions, they 
can sell their additional permit to other firms who are not able to make the 
necessary reductions. In this way, creating a market for tradable permits gives 
companies direct incentives to reduce their emissions output—in fact, if they 
can sell their additional permits at a price greater than the cost of emissions 
reduction, they would gain a net benefit from their externality-reducing 
innovation. As William Cline explains, “[A]batement will thus be pursued at a 
minimum cost . . . in contrast to the result with a rigid, nontradeable quota 
system.”196 
 A cap and trade market for pollution externalities is similar to a tax on 
emissions, but it varies in several important regards. For instance, unlike a 
                                                 
193 RICHARD F. KOSOBUD ET AL., COST-EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF URBAN SMOG: THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHICAGO CAP-AND-TRADE APPROACH 48 (2006). 
194 See id. (“[I]t will often not be possible to have private parties negotiate or adjudicate 
compensation for externalities, positive or negative, because of the number of people involved, 
the time lag of effects, or other complicating factors.”). 
195 Id. at 1-2. 
196 WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING 351 (1992). 
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system of taxation, which adds to the price of polluting but does not specify 
any target or cap for individual or aggregate emissions, tradable permits make 
it “possible to specify the exact cutback in emissions.”197 The regulatory 
agency need not determine the appropriate price of emissions based on the 
externalities they may produce, which vary based on the type of pollutant.198 
Nonuniform emissions present regulators the challenge of setting a tax based 
on an element of uncertainty, wherein different outputs might produce more or 
less substantial externalities as the volume of pollutants vary in degree. The 
agency tasked with imposing pollution taxes “must set the tax with care” to 
account for these complexities, and “[f]requent adjustments to the tax rate may 
be in order, with obvious economic impacts on the regulated community.”199 
Cap and trade, by comparison, only requires regulators to determine the level 
of aggregate emissions reduction it seeks to achieve, and allocating a tradable 
permit allows the optimal pollution-reducing price to be revealed by the 
market.200 
 Allocating permits instead of formulating a tax rate may pose 
difficulties in different contexts, however. Initial quota allocations may be 
fiercely competitive process, and regulatory agencies must grapple with 
normative issues involved in such allocations. This issue is most salient in 
recent debates over whether to extend a carbon emissions cap and trade system 
globally. Many have favored this approach, since “most countries already have 
extensive infrastructures in place for monitoring emissions, and it seems 
unlikely that the marginal administrative costs associated with tradeable 
permits for carbon emissions would be high.”201 The major difficulty in 
reaching consensus is whether quotas should be allocated to countries on a per 
capita basis—that is, with each country receiving a fixed allocation multiplied 
by their total population—or based on historical output measures such as gross 
domestic product.202 In this context, a tax may be favorable because it skirts 
the issues while still providing a deterrent mechanism to combat global climate 
change. 
 The cap and trade system has gained prominence in recent years and 
has “become established as the principal alternative to taxes as an efficient 
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mechanism for pollution control.”203 In large part, agencies have been attracted 
to this alternative because they “do[] not need to know the [marginal 
abatement cost] schedules of firms in order to arrive at the target level of 
emissions.”204 The Environmental Protection Agency made “effective in the 
year 2000, a system of tradable pollution permits for sulphur dioxide emissions 
(the cause of acid rain) by electrical utilities,” with the “total number of 
allowances . . . capped well below the total annual emissions of sulphur 
dioxide.”205 In many instances where environmental agencies have introduced 
a cap and trade mechanism, however, trading volume has not been substantial. 
Firms may have difficulty predicting if and when they may be required to 
purchase (or sell) additional permits on the market, as the decision involves 
numerous intrafirm accounting questions and demand projections.206 Cap and 
trade’s innovative features are extremely attractive, however, because they 
represent “a less dramatic change in the manner of pollution regulation than 
taxes, compared with the currently dominant means of regulation . . . and thus 
may be easier to introduce.”207 
 This regulatory mechanism readily applies to campaign finance 
regulations. Its strengths over taxes on externalities presents an attractive 
alternative device to maximize participation. As the next Section describes, a 
campaign finance cap and trade system can curb the externalities of campaign 
contributions while still providing incentives that would broaden and enhance 
citizen participation. 
 
B. Implementing Cap and Trade for Political Contributions 
 
In environmental economics, a cap and trade mechanism allows 
flexibility among those who produce externalities through the creation of a 
tradable permit market. Cap and trade is favorable to a tax when externalities 
themselves are difficult to ascertain and price, in which the tax rate calculated 
would be more arbitrary than efficient. By comparison, cap and trade simply 
sets a level of output and assigns property-like permits that are transferable.208 
This Section proposes a campaign finance reform mechanism that would 
embrace this notion of transferrable rights to make political donations and 
argues that it is superior to existing regulatory mechanisms and proposals. A 
cap and trade mechanism would provide incentives (rather than subsidies) to 
encourage greater political participation and would enhance participation by 
allowing individuals to donate above existing contribution caps to their 
candidate or party of choice. 
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 1. Mechanics 
 
Translating the pollution tax framework from environmental economics 
to the context of campaign finance requires a slight modification of how to 
allocate permits, but the structure is otherwise the same. To illustrate, if 
campaign regulations changed to grant a permit allowing an individual the 
right to contribute an amount of $1000 and this permit were tradable like a 
pollution permit, many would sell these rights to those who desire to give 
beyond the $1000 limit. This would effectively subsidize nonparticipation—
individuals who never make donations could sell their permit to individuals 
who make large donations. In this way, campaign contributions are not akin to 
pollution, since the goal of a participation-maximizing reform would be to 
broaden giving, not to encourage inactivity. One can remedy this downside of 
straightforward cap and trade, however, by requiring donors to give a certain 
amount before receiving the tradable permit. 
A simple example of how to grant tradable permits erases this 
difficulty. Consider a contribution cap at $500 per person per election year.209 
Under a cap and trade system, each individual who contributes $500 would 
receive a permit allowing another donation up to $500. With this permit, she 
either can make another donation (bringing her total up to $1000), or she can 
sell this permit on an exchange or in person to another interested buyer. The 
permit itself, then, would be akin to an option to donate—either she can donate 
again using the permit, or she can sell the permit to a buyer, who would be 
entitled to donate the additional $500. The price of the permit would vary 
based on demand for additional contributions, but the price of the permit would 
give the seller cash back. In other words, if an individual gives $500 to her 
candidate of choice, receives a permit, and sells it for $50, then she will have 
donated at a discount—$450. The market price for permits thus offers an 
incentive to make political contributions. 
Extending this example, consider the perspective of the permit buyer. 
He would make a $500 donation to his candidate of choice, and would receive 
a permit. If he strongly desires to participate further and to give more to 
favored candidate, he can exercise his permit and donate an additional $500, 
then buy a permit and use it to donate a third time. In this case, the individual 
would pay the price of acquiring an additional permit, plus the total amount of 
donations. If the permit price is $50 (as before), then he would pay a total of 
$1550. Like a tax on contributions, the individual would be paying more than 
the favored candidate receives, but the transaction offers an incentive to 
individuals who are only able to pay a certain amount. 
                                                 
209 This contribution limit is lower than federal restrictions on contributions, see supra note 
139, but many state contribution limits are set close to this level. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 
U.S. 230, 250-51 (2006) (citing several state contribution limits “at or below $500 per 
election”); William J. Connolly, Note, How Low Can You Go? State Campaign Contribution 
Limits and the First Amendment, 76 B.U. L. REV. 483 (1996). This Article does not propose an 
explicit cap amount, but uses different amounts throughout the analysis to explain how the cap 
and trade mechanism might work. 
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 A ready objection to this cap and trade mechanism arises, however, that 
paying $500 to receive a permit would isolate individuals who cannot afford to 
make such an investment. Though the $500 amount used for this example is 
purely illustrative, the objection is equally valid whether the permit threshold 
is $1000 or $100—it only would benefit the wealthy who can afford a large 
enough contribution to receive a tradable permit. This objection focuses more 
on the cap and trade mechanism’s design, which can be implemented to make 
the incentive widely available. Pollution permits, for example, are traded in 
small quantities rather than lump sums—a firm can sell 1%, 2%, or 50% of its 
quota allocation on the cap and trade market, which results in a more efficient 
price than lump sums of pollution output. 
 To reproduce this feature of pollution cap and trade, a campaign 
contribution system could grant permits in the amount each person contributes, 
up to a certain level. Altering the previous example slightly, if someone gives 
$50 (or any amount up to $500), she would receive a permit in that amount to 
trade. The market for trading permits would function identically, trading dollar 
amounts instead of $500 lump sum permits. On the market, permits would 
have the same price, so if a $1 permit sells for $.10, then the $50 donor could 
sell her permit for $5, and the $500 donor could sell her permit for $50. The 
effect would be the same, provided that contributions are capped. Assuming 
demand for political contributions remains the same, lowering the cap would 
increase the price for donation-permits, thereby increasing the 
incentive/discount effect for new contributors. 
 Implementing this reform structure would not require significant 
deviation from existing regulatory devices. In fact, a state or federal campaign 
finance regime could leave its existing contribution limits in place, but 
implement this system of providing permits based on contributions given. To 
comply with FEC and state regulations, one already must report political 
donations—permits themselves could be allocated upon confirming these 
contributions. A secure trading platform would not be difficult to enable. 
Online futures markets already provide a secure framework trading a high 
volume of various futures contracts;210 by comparison, a campaign finance cap 
and trade system would produce a price for only one asset—the dollar-value of 
a permit. Implementing this framework would not be cost-prohibitive. 
 Competing proposals are less desirable from a cost-savings perspective 
or represent a more radical departure from the status quo. Vouchers and other 
direct subsidy mechanisms entail considerable investment in providing equal 
allocations that can be transferred to political candidates or parties. 
Administrative costs, such as enforcing existing regulations or ensuring no 
abuse of these vouchers, further diminish their viability. A progressive tax on 
contributions is less cost-prohibitive, but it would require upending existing 
contribution limits entirely. And, as the previous Section suggests, the need to 
dynamically update the tax rate may only increase the regulatory burden and 
hinder the contribution tax’s effectiveness. 
                                                 
210 See Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J. ECON PERSP., Spring 2004, 
at 107 (describing online prediction futures markets). 
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  2. Benefits 
 
 In Part II, I advocated a campaign finance regulation premised on two 
prongs of maximizing participation: broadening and enhancing. This 
framework operates on the assumption that contributions are a valid form of 
participating, in parity with civic republican notions of direct involvement and 
deliberation. The campaign finance cap and trade mechanism furthers both of 
these substantive goals while still allowing flexibility in mitigating the 
externalities associated with large contributions. 
 The central feature of campaign finance cap and trade is that it provides 
incentives for participation through making political contributions. As this 
Section’s examples suggest, permits can be allocated to allow trading in any 
amount, whether through one-for-one dollars for permits or once an individual 
meets the contribution limit. In either case, the trading mechanism allocates the 
incentive broadly, reducing the cost of this method of participating. Though 
this incentive device does not broadly subsidize the population with vouchers 
to earmark as contributions, it reduces the widespread cost of participating in 
the political process. Unlike subsidies, which may compel their recipients to 
substitute free voucher money for their previous contributions, this incentive 
device is a cost-reducing mechanism. Voucher mechanisms such as Patriot 
Dollars are based on the premise that participation is enhanced when one 
receives a free contribution subsidy. Scholars have questioned this 
presumption, suggesting instead that it might only increase political cynicism 
while flooding politics with additional money. Construing participation in 
narrow, binary terms, the cap and trade incentive device may fall short of the 
promise of vouchers. To its credit, however, cap and trade elicits meaningful 
rather than hollow participation. 
By granting individuals the right to purchase permits that allow 
contributions above existing limits, it allows greater choice over one’s 
preferred form of self-expression and effective participation in the political 
process. The cap and trade mechanism derives its incentive component from 
the increasing premium wealthy donors must pay for the right to contribute 
larger sums. Each transaction that shifts a permit from seller to buyer provides 
a rebate to the low-level donor while taxing the high-level donor. If demand 
for contributions among the wealthy increases, so too does the incentive for 
new contributors who may receive an attractive price for their dollar-for-dollar 
permit. 
Another key benefit of the cap and trade mechanism for campaign 
contributions is that it mitigates externalities without relying on an ex ante 
estimate of the price (or tax structure) of campaign money. At its core, this 
mechanism recognizes the dual nature of contributions—they serve as a 
method of political participation, and they represent a source of corruption and 
improper influence over the political process by wealthy interests. These 
externalities are difficult to ascertain, and the first-order question of their 
definition may be unresolvable. But a cap and trade system only requires a 
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regulator to choose the maximum level of permissible contributions, and the 
market put in place reveals the price of high donations. As an empirical point, 
the information revealed by this pricing mechanism would provide an ideal 
starting point for further reforms. If demand for contributions above the limit is 
low, it may suggest strongly diminishing marginal returns to contributions. If 
demand is high and the price for contributing above the limit rises, it may 
suggest that caps truly do stifle the individual benefits of this form of 
participation, or that alternative outlets for political money are much less 
desirable than direct donations. 
 
C. An Alternative: Regulation Through Taxation 
 
 One alternative to cap and trade often proffered in environmental 
economics is a direct tax on the production of externalities. David Gamage 
extends this method to campaign finance, advocating a radical departure from 
the existing regulatory regime in favor of a progressive tax on political 
donations.211 Like this Article’s analysis, Gamage’s rests his proposal on two 
basic observations regarding campaign finance: (1) caps or other limitations on 
contributions increase transaction costs by limiting the subjective value one 
derives from donating,212 and (2) contributions themselves create externalities, 
such as corruption and inequality, which are the central motivation for 
campaign regulation.213 Replacing contribution limits with progressive taxes, 
he argues, would “produce . . . additional surplus over contribution 
ceilings.”214 From the standpoint of participation-maximization, taxing 
contributions is indeed superior to capping them outright. I offer a general 
critique of this proposal as compared to the cap and trade mechanism, and 
advance two extensions of the tax model that might enhance participation. 
 Central to a tax on political contributions is the notion that, above some 
level, contributions create negative externalities. Placing a tax on producers of 
externalities will raise the cost of their output, thereby decreasing aggregate 
harm. Taxes can serve as a more direct form of ex ante liability rules, offering 
a price instead of a sanction for this behavior. As Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell explain in the context of taxes on industrial polluters, “The primary 
advantage of liability rules, recall, is that firms facing liability are allowed to 
decide for themselves whether and how much to pollute, on the basis of their 
knowledge of the costs of pollution prevention and of the extra profits they can 
make by expanding production.”215 
 Campaign contributions operate much like pollution outputs. Much like 
polluting firms, individuals have better information regarding the benefit they 
                                                 
211 David S. Gamage, Note, Taxing Political Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes in 
Campaign Finance, 113 YALE L.J. 1283 (2004). 
212 Id. at 1305 (“[T]ransaction costs reduce the effectiveness of diverted funds. . . . Transaction 
costs measure the difference between the value a donor derives from contributing directly and 
the value the donor would have received from diverting her funds.”). 
213 Id. at 1312-20. 
214 Id. at 1309. 
215 Id. at 750. 
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receive from this method of participating in the political process. If there are 
diminishing marginal returns to each additional dollar contributed, increasing 
their price will prompt someone to cut back on their total contributions.216 
With the decline in aggregate contributions that would accompany broadly 
levied contribution taxes, externalities—such as the possibility that wealthy 
interests might “secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential 
office holders”217—will diminish as well. The benefit of taxes over caps stems 
from the fact that beyond arbitrary $2000 limits, individuals still derive 
benefits just as parties to any mutual transaction. A tax perfectly calibrated 
such that every individual donor internalizes the social cost of his or her 
contribution would provide an optimal level of political money—each person 
would stop giving once the costs outweigh their individual benefits.218 With 
refinement based on the estimated degree of externalities produced by 
individual donations, a progressive tax could roughly approximate this harm 
and internalize it to major political donors. 
 Such a tax scheme is not unprecedented. “Sin taxes” are levied on 
cigarettes, alcohol, and gambling.219 Luxury taxes have been applied to certain 
consumer goods.220 The emerging “libertarian paternalism” paradigm, which 
embraces “freedom of choice” even when consumption choices produce 
certain self-harm or social harm,221 has associated these corrective measures as 
a nonintrusive method of deterring externalities. A tax on campaign 
contributions reflects the dual character of this form of participation.222 Pro-
reformers concerned with the inegalitarian consequences of a permissive 
campaign finance scheme undoubtedly would approve of a progressive 
campaign finance tax over no regulation at all, though they still may view caps 
as superior. This posture makes it either the ideal regulatory choice for a 
pluralistic society or the unanimous second-best choice for a polarized 
democracy. Though it is a promising alternative to cap and trade as a method 
of increasing participation, the model has several shortcomings. 
                                                 
216 To provide a very simplified example, if an individual is willing to spend $100 contributing 
to his or her favorite politician running for reelection, a 10% tax on the contribution will raise 
its total price to $110. Adjusting for this increased price back to the $100 budget constraint, the 
individual would give the candidate $90.91, with $9.09 going to the government. 
217 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976). 
218 A perfectly calibrated tax of this sort obviously could not be calculated, as it would require 
knowing the variance of individual preferences, as well as a strong understanding of the shape 
of externalities contributions produce. Gamage is careful to point out that any broadly applied 
tax would overcorrect and undercorrect for these individual disparities. See Gamage, supra 
note 211, at 1294 n.43 (“A contribution tax set to maximize tax revenue might cause 
deadweight loss by over- or underdeterring donations.”). 
219 See Bret F. Meich, The Power To Destroy: The Psychology of Gaming Taxation, 12 
GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 458, 461-62 (2008) (discussing sin taxes). 
220 See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Regulatory Takings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2203-04 
(2004) (discussing luxury taxes). 
221 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 237 (2008). 
222 Gamage’s model starts with “the premise that political donations are neither categorically 
harmful 
nor categorically benign.” Gamage, supra note 211, at 1285. 
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1. Limits to the Tax on Donations 
 
The tax on campaign contributions is not without its flaws. Central to 
its efficacy is the ability of Congress or agencies implementing the progressive 
tax scheme to calculate the degree of externalities. Given the elusive, 
amorphous nature of externalities produced by campaign contributions, any tax 
scheme may be arbitrary. In addition, replacing caps with taxes would not 
mitigate the availability of substitute targets for donations. If political action 
committees become increasingly sophisticated and almost as effective as 
candidates themselves in producing an impact, a progressive tax would divert 
money, like water, in the same manner as existing caps. This Subsection 
considers these two difficulties in turn, and argues that cap and trade is 
superior in both crucial regards. 
Since Buckley, reformers have compiled a seemingly endless string of 
detrimental effects that political money may produce, such as “corruption” 
(both in appearance and actuality),223 “inequalit[y],”224 “cynicism,”225 “threats 
to free and equitable participation,”226 and “ceaseless sound-bites of trivial 
information,”227 just to name a few. Sorting the externalities from the 
trivialities would be an unenviable task—a political body attempting to qualify 
and quantify these “externalities” would face a Sisyphean task.228 By 
comparison, taxes on externalities are effective and efficient when quantifiable. 
As Robert Cooter explains when evaluating the desirability of pollution taxes, 
“To compute the efficient tax, government officials must know the amount of 
external harm caused by the polluter . . . .”229 Since there is only “limited 
information about harm” caused by pollution,230 computing an efficient tax 
already carries a weighty burden. Calculating a tax on contributions presents 
dual issues of (1) what counts as an externality, and (2) the degree of each 
externality’s severity.231 
Cooter offers the following decision rule for lawmakers choosing 
whether to price or sanction an activity: “If obtaining accurate information 
about external costs is cheaper for officials than obtaining accurate information 
about socially optimal behavior, then they should control the activity by 
pricing it; if the converse is true, then they should control the activity by 
sanctioning it.”232 This decision rule suggests that controlling an activity 
                                                 
223 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24 (1976). 
224 Overton, supra note 104, at 92. 
225 Wright, supra note 61, at 1020. 
226 David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 245 (1991). 
227 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 277 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
228 See BeVier, supra note 190, at 1170 (“[C]orruption is a notoriously elusive concept.”). 
229 Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1550 (1984). 
230 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 717. 
231 This Article’s premise also suggests that participation in the form of contributions is a 
positive externality for society that, weighted against other negative externalities, might further 
complicate this calculus. 
232 Cooter, supra note 229, at 1533 (emphasis omitted). 
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through pricing it (with a tax or liability rule) is inferior to sanctioning the 
behavior (for instance, by capping the amount of the activity permitted). To his 
credit, Gamage recognizes this conceptual difficulty, and argues that 
“policymakers also need to estimate the expected level of externalities and 
transaction costs when setting contribution ceilings. In fact, policymakers need 
more information to set optimal contribution ceilings than they need to set 
optimal contribution taxes.”233 Comparing flawed ceilings to flawed taxes does 
not bolster the case for the contribution tax, especially when the transaction 
costs of implementing a new tax provision already pose a hindrance. As a 
device to maximize citizen participation, a tax is superior to a contribution 
limits, but its associated costs and uncertainties may be too much to bear.234 By 
comparison, cap and trade for campaign contributions relies on the market to 
price externalities, and only requires a singular government decision—the 
threshold “limit” that determines how many tradable contribution permits one 
may acquire initially. 
A second difficulty facing any tax on contributions is that it must 
account for the existence of political action committees, 527 groups, and other 
issue-advocates who may serve as outlets for cash once the marginal cost of 
additional contributions (imposed by the tax) becomes too high. In other 
words, the “hydraulic” effect in which donors “circumvent fundraising 
restrictions” will persist, whether rerouted by progressive taxes or by 
contribution limits.235 Replacing ceilings with taxes should mitigate this effect, 
given the presumption that noncandidate or nonparty donation targets are the 
second choice among contributors. But to effectively account for the 
availability of this alternative, the policymaker must either design a tax 
covering political donations of every sort or reduce the “optimal” tax to reduce 
this secondary consequence of regulation. 
 
                                                 
233 Gamage, supra note 211, at 1326. Gamage also cites Cooter to support this point. See id. at 
1326-27 n.156 (“To compute the efficient tax, government officials must know the amount of 
external harm caused by the polluter and nothing more. By contrast, to discover the efficient 
standard, officials must balance the external harm against the cost of abatement, which 
requires complete information on each polluter’s abatement technology.” (quoting Cooter, 
supra note 229, at 1550-51)). This point is difficult to apply to campaign contributions. 
Cooter’s argument probably upholds the opposite argument, since “abatement” of 
contributions simply entails not donating. An “efficient standard”—that is, a contribution 
ceiling—may be easier to calculate under uncertainty than a tax. 
234 The resulting tax likely would be the product of political bargaining in Congress, unless it 
authorizes the Federal Election Commission to adopt a tax structure via rulemaking. Political 
branches, particularly the President, may attempt to exert substantial pressure on this process, 
see Elana Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV L. REV. 2245 (2001), and the agency 
would face difficulty in adapting such a tax to dynamic changes in circumstances. See Thomas 
O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” The Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 
(1992). The FEC’s recent failure to adopt a rule covering 527 groups suggests a grim prospect 
for adopting a tax via rulemaking. See Ryan, supra note 167, at 490 (“Despite . . . admonitions 
from Senators and House Members, the FEC eventually decided in 2004 not to promulgate a 
rule clarifying when 527 organizations must register as political committees and, instead 
decided to proceed on a case-by-case enforcement action basis.”). 
235 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 5, at 1736. 
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  2. Refining the Tax on Donations 
 
 Despite these difficulties, replacing contribution limits with a tax on 
political donations would be an improvement over the status quo. Removing 
limits and implementing a price structure might raise fears of severe dilution of 
small contributions, but this concern may be allayed depending on how 
progressive a scheme policymakers enact. The broadening prong of the 
participatory model, on the other hand, would remain unaffected. In this 
regard, the tax model is incomplete, and requires refinement. 
 Broadening participation would require only a slight extension on the 
contribution tax model. Gamage suggests, but does not explore, the possibility 
of “contribution taxes as a mechanism for funding public financing of 
campaigns.”236 Operating in the domain of tax policy, the benefit this 
mechanism might provide is not difficult to envision. Various states provide 
tax incentives for political contributions, such as $50 or $100 credits or 
deductions for donations to state-level candidates.237 Replicating this system at 
a national level in addition to a progressive tax on contributions could provide 
a cost-neutral method of enhancing participation.238 One proposal suggests that 
a tax credit could “increase participation in politics by ordinary citizens” and 
advocates “income caps to reduce the possibility that the credit will be a 
windfall for behavior that would occur anyway and to target the tax incentive 
to those who are not currently giving.”239 Like vouchers, tax credits amount to 
subsidies, involving minimal costs to individual donors. They could substitute 
for actual contributions, or they might prompt little meaningful or considered 
participation. In this regard, a tax deduction might be a superior incentive 
device for enhancing and broadening participation. It would reduce the cost of 
making a donation while still providing enough incentive for self-education 
and political awareness. One might argue, however, that tax deductions—only 
made available during tax season—may only marginally increase participation 
among previously nondonating citizens. This objection is well-taken, as I 
believe that tax incentives provide only limited efficacy in broadening 
participation. 
 Another method of utilizing the proceeds of a progressive tax on 
contributions would be to credit equal amounts of total tax proceeds to each 
candidate in an election earmarked for compensating volunteers (instead of for 
advertising and media use240). As explained in Section II.B, the participatory 
                                                 
236 Id. at 1331. 
237 See supra note 150. 
238 The idea of providing tax incentives for political contributions at the federal level has been 
raised before in the literature. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, TAX INCENTIVES FOR POLITICAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS? (1964); DAVID ROSENBERG, BROADENING THE BASE: THE CASE FOR A NEW 
FEDERAL TAX CREDIT FOR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (2002). 
239 John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591, 
646, 647 (2005). 
240 In the 2008 election cycle, 30.8% of Senator John McCain’s expenditures were devoted to 
“media,” see OpenSecrets, Expenditures Breakdown, John McCain, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/expend.php?cycle=2008&cid=N00006424 (last visited 
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model does not discriminate against contributions or direct volunteering as 
methods of valid participation. It does note, though, that participation’s 
opportunity cost is substantial enough that it dramatically reduces individual 
incentives to become actively involved. Subsidizing volunteer work could help 
fill this gap, allowing individuals who cannot afford substantial contributions 
to participate without foregoing payment.241 
The secondary effect of rerouting tax proceeds to equally distributed 
volunteer dollars would be to increase the marginal cost of enormous campaign 
contributions. Consider a progressive tax scheme that taxes $50,000 of 
donations in a given year at 75%, and $100,000 of donations in a given year at 
150%. The lower of the two donations would provide $50,000 to the donor’s 
candidate of choice, and $37,500 of tax proceeds split evenly—$18,750 to the 
favored candidate and $18,750 to the opponent. In this scenario, the favored 
candidate would receive $68,750 in total contributions and the opponent would 
receive $18,750. In the latter scenario, a $100,000 donation in reality would 
give the favored candidate $175,000 and the opponent $75,000. Assuming the 
donor has diminishing marginal returns to her spending, the opponent’s gain 
would be a disincentive to give increasing amounts of donations. This 
mechanism could leverage a tax—already intended to control for the 
externalities of massive contributions—to increase public participation. Under 
the model I propose, this tax-and-spend scheme would broaden and enhance 
democratic participation.242 
To be certain, the participatory model laid out in Part II is somewhat 
compatible with the progressive contribution tax, but many caveats about the 
mechanism’s weaknesses are in order. These weaknesses can translate into 
strengths only by modifying the proposed framework of forcing individuals to 
internalize the full cost of their contributions. The cap and trade system suffers 
certain drawbacks, but as the next Section discusses, each may be remedied 
with only slight modifications. 
 
D. Problems with Campaign Finance Cap and Trade 
                                                                                                                                
Mar. 12, 2009); and 47.9% of President Obama’s expenditures went to media, see 
OpenSecrets, supra note 160. 
241 Such a proposal might be valuable to fund in its own right. This analysis operates under the 
idea that a proposal should be cost-neutral, though a future public funding reform proposal 
would benefit from including measures of this sort that directly broaden participation. 
242 Ideals of participation that consider direct volunteering or political engagement as superior 
to contributing, such as the civic republican vision, may find this refined tax proposal more 
appealing than one that simply replaces caps with progressive taxes. This proposal may face 
constitutional difficulties under an expansive reading of Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). 
Under BCRA, if a self-funded candidate passes a certain threshold level of individual 
expenditures on his own campaign, his opponent gains a fundraising advantage allowing 
contributors higher contribution caps. Id. at 2766. The Court found that this provision violated 
the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, id. at 2771, but it emphasized the “asymmetrical” 
scheme that took “the unprecedented step of imposing different contribution and coordinated 
party expenditure limits on candidates vying for the same seat.” Id. at 2773, 2774. This 
proposal differs by presenting contributors, not candidates, with this choice, which is not 
asymmetrical except among those who wish to donate different amounts. 
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Given the fluid nature of political money and the plurality of views on 
its valid scope in the political process, any reform proposal will be lacking. 
This Article suggests that a cap and trade incentive device may increase and 
enhance participation, but it may fall well short of advancing egalitarian or 
libertarian ideals. Unlike egalitarian-based voucher proposals, for example, the 
tradable permit system does not attempt to provide an equal endowment to all 
voting citizens. But more fundamentally, any cap and trade proposal for 
political money must grapple with possible unintended consequences that 
could ensue. 
A cap and trade mechanism for political contributions might be 
construed as one step short of vote buying. Indeed, “spending great amounts of 
money on an election looks like buying it”243—a potential justification for 
limiting campaign contributions generally. Allowing and encouraging the 
transfer of rights to contribute additional campaign dollars would create a new 
market in political culture. One need not embrace the civic republican ideal to 
recognize that this arena may be one best left to individual devices. In this 
sense, the cap and trade model lends itself to cultural critiques that the 
mechanism only commodifies participation.244 Relying on a market mechanism 
to facilitate and enhance this form of participation also undermines egalitarian 
notions of justice. As Frank Pasquale notes, “Without governmental guarantees 
of access, wealthier interests can simply bid poorer ones out of the market for 
political influence.”245 Participation may increase, but at the expense of 
diluting the voice of less wealthy citizens wishing to play a role in the political 
process. 
This critique should be carefully considered in any attempt to create 
market incentives for political contributions, though the alternatives seem to 
fare no better. Government funded grants, such as vouchers, may encourage 
citizen participation but ignore the liberty-based underpinnings of citizen 
participation.246 Relying on direct government subsidies morphs the ideal of 
active citizen self-government into a system of government-enabled self-
government—a contradiction in terms. A cap and trade system would 
decentralize control over participation while still curbing its externalities. In 
addition, the broader cultural critique is inapt. Markets are central to our 
political culture, and adding a market that transfers rights to make 
                                                 
243 Ortiz, supra note 69, at 910. 
244 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1871 
(1987) (arguing that, under a conception of “[u]niversal noncommodification . . . the 
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245 Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance 
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contributions would not uncover any mask hiding this reality.247 Rather, a cap 
and trade mechanism accepts the premise that politics rely on markets, and 
creates incentives for participation in the system as it stands, not as it should 
be. 
A more serious problem for campaign finance cap and trade may be 
endemic to the market mechanism itself. One cannot predetermine demand for 
campaign money precisely, and setting limits too low may lead to a high price 
for tradable contribution permits. For example, if a permit trades above one 
dollar, it would allow anyone to profit from making a contribution under the 
cap.248 Anyone who contributes could sell their allocation of additional right to 
contribute for more than the price of the additional donation—in effect, free 
money for giving a political donation. This effect would undermine the 
participatory model I advance, because participation would be reduced to a 
profit motive—even more dubious than subsidizing participation through 
vouchers. Nevertheless, this turn of events would be extremely unlikely. The 
profit opportunity would prompt enough new contributors that supply would 
increase and drive down the price of permits. This instance is a low probability 
event and its very occurrence would suggest a poorly functioning cap and trade 
market, but high prices for permits may still arise. The closer the permit price 
comes to one dollar, the more the incentive resembles a subsidy because it 
makes the cost of contributing to one’s favored candidate almost negligible. It 
is difficult to predict ex ante how the permit price might evolve, though 
historical data is available on the rate of contributing over the course of the 
entire election cycle.249 To ensure against this possibility would require setting 
contribution limits sufficiently high that they do not vastly constrict the supply 
of political money. 
A related difficulty, though less probable, is that entrepreneurs could 
exploit a market for contribution permits by forecasting supply and demand 
patterns for political money. Contributions during the presidential primary 
season are much lower in volume than after each party’s candidate is 
determined, for example.250 An individual could donate up to the limit early in 
the election cycle, and then purchase additional permits for a low price. 
Inevitably, once the general election season heats up and individuals wish to 
contribute greater amounts to the candidates, the price for permits would 
increase, and the “investors” could sell their hoarded permits for a substantial 
                                                 
247 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 86, at 689 (“Before the election, [independent] 
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additional $500. If this permit trades for above $500, then selling it on the market would allow 
anyone to contribute up to the limit to profit. 
249 See, e.g., OpenSecrets, Fundraising Over Time, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/weekly.php?cycle=2008 (last visited Mar. 13, 2009) 
(providing a day-by-day comparison of funds raised by the major presidential candidates in the 
2008 election). 
250 See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 102, at 36. 
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profit. The marketization of campaign contributions, in this case, would fuel 
speculation instead of broadening or enhancing participation. This danger 
could be curbed in a number of ways, but in particular, the financial option-like 
features of contribution permits allow a simple solution. If permits for 
additional contributions expire after a certain period of time (for example, 
three weeks), then one cannot hoard permits for later sale. Requiring every 
permit to expire by a certain date after their grant would undercut this profit 
opportunity, forcing the permit-holders either to trade or to contribute their 
allocation. 
At a general level, these complications undermine the assertion of 
simplicity in the cap and trade system. One of its strengths vis-à-vis the 
progressive tax on donations is that it requires no ex ante pricing based on the 
nature and magnitude of externalities. Cap and trade’s relative weakness, 
however, is that it may require more administrative costs to operate effectively. 
Though the cultural critique, that cap and trade will coarsen this method of 
participation through commodification, is difficult to overcome entirely, 




 This Article attempts to reroute a burgeoning area of campaign finance 
scholarship and reform. Participation in democratic politics is gaining 
increased recognition as a valid or even primary goal to advance through the 
regulation of campaign contributions and expenditures. Though this 
development is laudable, many participation-enhancing proposals rest on 
unworkable or self-defeating notions of equality. In building an alternative 
model of maximizing participation, this Article rejects the premise that direct 
political action such as volunteering embodies a superior form of participation 
to contributions, but recognizes the externalities that the latter form may 
produce. The cap and trade mechanism, though imperfect, presents a step 
toward maximizing participation that does not suffer the shortcomings of 
numerous other reform proposals. 
 Previous scholarship suggests that the goal of broadening participation 
stands in tension with the goal of enhancing participation. For example, 
enhancing participation by removing contribution limits entirely could dilute 
smaller donations, compelling many small money donors to opt out entirely. 
This tension exists, but reform efforts should begin with this understanding, 
not end there. The status quo framework of most federal and state campaign 
regulation reflects the Buckley compromise based on the 
contribution/expenditure distinction, and I join the chorus of voices arguing 
that this distinction does a disservice to efforts to adopt a nuanced 
understanding of political money. Political participation, which this Article 
advocates as an end to advance through campaign regulation, also deserves a 
nuanced analysis. Advancing participation as a substantive goal requires 
moving beyond the routine liberty/equality debate and embracing the notion 
that participation must be enhanced and broadened through reform. 
